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Every year witnesses the widespread destruction of property,
the limited loss of life, and the infliction of personal injuries dur-
ing "natural disasters." Many times homes are located in areas
geologically unsuitable for habitation. As a result, the residents
may be surprised to learn they live in areas facing natural risks,
such as avalanches, erosion, fires, floods, hurricanes, landslides,
mudslides, tornadoes and volcanoes. Had they only known, the
occupants claim, they would not have purchased homes in these
vulnerable areas. Therefore, the purchasers contend, the sellers
should be liable for failure to disclose the risks to them prior to the
purchase.'
Such a claim would historically be met by the seemingly hal-
lowed defense of caveat emptor, commonly translated as "let the
buyer beware." Caveat emptor stood as a bulwark against suits
by purchasers based upon a failure to disclose. Under caveat
emptor, the seller has no duty to disclose facts unknown to the
purchaser; silence is golden. The purchaser would be left without
a legal remedy against the seller or the broker.
The thesis of this article is that caveat emptor no longer pre-
cludes relief. The last half of the twentieth century has witnessed
a virtual collapse in fact, if not in legal theory, of caveat emptor.2
The duty to disclose in real estate transactions has undergone a
well-documented metamorphosis from caveat emptor to a quasi-
caveat vendor. It is fair to state the Property law rule of caveat
emptor has been superseded by the Tort law doctrine of a duty to
disclose.
* Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law; A.B. 1967, J.D. 1970, Univer-
sity of San Francisco; LL.M. 1971, S.J.D. 1973, University of Michigan.
i One commentator referred to the litigation, which follows landslides in California,
as the "California landslide litigation syndrome." Bob Risley, Landslide Peril and Home-
owner's Insurance in California, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1993).
2 Cf. Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
3 Cf. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRAcTs (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed.
1995).
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It is also the thesis of this article that natural risks-be it a
tornado in Kansas, a blizzard in New York, a volcano in Washing-
ton, or an earthquake in California-are foreseeable: foreseeable
both in fact and in law. Our purpose is not to debate the desirabil-
ity of building in geologically fragile areas. The assumption is
that society, through the political process, has approved such con-
struction. Rather, the purpose of the article is to posit the premise
that the seller, and the seller's agent, owe a duty to disclose to the
purchaser all material geologic hazards of which they know or rea-
sonably should know.
This article will look at the history of the caveat emptor doc-
trine, the exceptions that have developed to it, and the foreseeabil-
ity of geologic hazards.
HISTORY OF CAVEAT EMPTOR
The phrase "caveat emptor" is of Latin derivation. Thus, one
could reasonably assume the doctrine harkens back to ancient Ro-
man law. Yet, in an exhaustive, historical survey, Professor Ham-
ilton traces the phrase to the sixteenth century in a case involving
horse trading.4 The phrase may sound of Roman law, but the ori-
gin lies in the common law developed in the late sixteenth century
English trading society.'
Rationales behind the principle included the premise that the
parties to the transaction possessed equal bargaining power, skill
and experience. Both parties were equally able to discover the
conditions of the land and property.6 The gist of caveat emptor
was that the parties must look out for themselves. Thus, if a pur-
chaser wanted protection, the purchaser should bargain for an ex-
press warranty.
In the famous 1873 case of Peek v. Gurney,' Lord Cairns
firmly stated the standard:
[M]ere nondisclosure of material facts, however morally censur-
able..., would, in my opinion, form no ground for an action in
the nature of misrepresentation."
The high point of caveat emptor in the United States came in
the late nineteenth century. Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged in 1870 that the doctrine had been accepted in all but one
jurisdiction. 9 The doctrine tied into the contemporary political
4 Walter H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1164
(1931) (hereinafter Hamilton).
5 Id. at 1156-57, 1187.
6 See, e.g., Jane P. Mallor, Extension of the Implied Warranty of Habitability to Pur-
chasers of Used Homes, 20 AM. Bus. L.J. 361, 363 (1982).
7 L.R. 6. H.L. 377 (1873).
s Id. at 403.
9 Bernard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383, 388 (1870).
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philosophy of "laissez faire."1" Since the government assiduously
avoided regulating commerce in general, leaving the parties
where they lay in real estate transactions fit into the general
approach."
The classic caveat emptor decision in the United States is the
famous 1942 case of Swinton v. Whitensville Savings Bank,"
where the seller failed to disclose to the purchaser that the house
was infested with termites. The court held the seller had no duty
to voluntarily disclose any facts. There was no allegation of false
or misleading statements, or even the uttering of a half-truth.
The basic allegation was a "mere failure to disclose." 3 The court
reasoned:
If the defendant is liable on this declaration, every seller is lia-
ble who fails to disclose any non-apparent defect known to him
in the subject of the sale which naturally reduces its value and
which the buyer fails to discover. Similarly, it would seem that
every buyer would be liable who fails to disclose any non-appar-
ent virtue known to him in the subject of the purchase which
materially enhances its value and of which the seller is
ignorant. 4
The court was unwilling to impose upon the frailties of human
nature such an idealistic standard. 5 The Swinton case has been
followed in several decisions.' Another example of caveat emptor
is Mercer v. Meinel,1' where the Illinois Supreme Court held a ven-
dor was not liable for personal injuries caused by the failure to
install a gas heater in compliance with a municipal ordinance.
The strength of caveat emptor can further be illustrated by a
1983 Virginia case, Kuczmanski v. Gill s.1  The purchasers discov-
ered, after moving in, the floors of both bathrooms had rotted
away, a toilet was supported from underneath by cinder blocks,
gutters did not work properly, and many storm windows were
lo Hamilton, supra note 4, at 1183-84, 1187.
ii Id. at 1184. One court traced caveat emptor to the "attitude of rugged individual-
ism reflected in the business economy and the law of the 19th century." Ollerman v.
O'Rourke Co., Inc. 288 N.W.2d 95, 101 (Wash. 1980).
12 42 N.E.2d 808 (Mass. 1942).
13 Id.
14 Id. Massachusetts subsequently enacted a Consumer Protection Act, which applies
to real estate brokers. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(a).
15 Id. at 808-9.
16 See, e.g., Gegeas v. Sherrill, 147 A.2d 223 (Md. 1958) (termite infestation); Stevens
v. Bouchard, 532 A.2d 1028 (Me. 1987); London v. Courdaff, 529 N.Y.S.2d 874 (App. Div.
1988); Oates v. JAG, Inc., 311 S.E.2d 369 (N.C. App. 1984); Nei v. Burley, 446 N.E.2d. 674
(Mass. 1983).
17 125 N.E. 288 (1919).
18 302 S.E.2d 48 (Va. 1983). See also Traverse v. Long, 135 N.E.2d 256, 259 (Ohio
1956), where the Ohio Supreme Court held caveat emptor applied if the condition com-
plained of is open to observation, or discoverable upon reasonable inspection, the purchaser
had the unimpeded opportunity to examine the premises, and there was no fraud on the
part of the vendor.
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missing. The purchasers were in a position to discover the prob-
lem, but had failed to look. The sellers made no affirmative mis-
representations. Consequently, the purchasers were denied relief.
Contrary to the attention afforded the Swinton case, the high-
water mark of caveat emptor was actually short-lived. Indeed, it
had already developed serious leaks long before 1942. For exam-
ple, the Washington Supreme Court recognized caveat emptor in
1895,19 but by 1909 acknowledged the trend to restrict, rather
than expand, the doctrine.2 °
In a 1922 case, the Kentucky Court of Appeals acknowledged
the rule of caveat emptor, but recognized that it could be relaxed
when the seller did something to prevent the prospective pur-
chaser from making a thorough examination to ascertain the
property's value, or when the purchaser had no reasonable oppor-
tunity to visit and examine the property due to its great distance
from the parties to the transaction.2' In 1926, California held the
doctrine was inapplicable to nonjudicial foreclosure sales.22
By 1936, Dean Keeton recognized a trend away from nondis-
closure: "[I]t would seem that the object of the law in these cases
should be to impose on parties to the transactions a duty to speak
whenever justice, equity, and fair dealing demand it." 23 Dean Kee-
ton posited that Lord Cairns may well have been expressing nine-
teenth century law, as shaped by an individualistic philosophy
based on freedom of contract, in which morality was not
relevant.24
In 1941, one year before the Massachusetts opinion in Swin-
ton, two California appellate courts held a vendor has a duty to
disclose to the purchaser that the lot was on fill. The vendor is
bound to disclose facts which, though known to the vendor, are not
visible to the purchaser, and the vendor realizes the facts are not
within the reach of diligent attention and observation of the
vendor.
In 1955 Dean Prosser wrote:
19 Washington Central Imp. Co. v. Newlands, 39 P. 366, 367 (Wash. 1895) ("[Ilt seems
to us that parties must exercise ordinary business sense and the faculties which are given
to them for the purpose of transacting business, and that they cannot call upon the law to
stand in loco parentis to them in the ordinary transactions of business and their ordinary
dealings with their fellow men.").
20 Wooddy v. Benton Water Co., 102 P. 1054, 1056 (Wash. 1909).
21 Osborne v. Howard, 242 S.W. 852 (Ky. 1922).
22 Mitchell v. California-Pacific Title Ins. Co., 248 P. 1035 (Cal. 1926).
23 W. Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Nondisclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 31
(1936).
24 Id.
25 Rothstein v. Janss Investment Co., 113 P.2d 465, 467 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941); Clauser
v. Taylor, 112 P.2d 661, 662 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941).
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The law appears to be working toward the ultimate conclusion
that full disclosure of all material facts must be made wherever
elementary fair conduct demands it. 6
Even though it held against the purchasers on the facts in a
case of termite infestation, the Washington Supreme Court stated
in 1966 that caveat emptor is not rigidly applied to the complete
exclusion of any moral and legal obligations to disclose material
facts not readily apparent upon reasonable inspection by the pur-
chaser.27 Other courts followed the approach of using modem con-
cepts of justice.2" Professor Freyfogle, in a 1985 article,29
recognized that California and Colorado took the lead in imposing
duties on sellers to disclose matters materially affecting the value
of property. This requirement includes disclosure of soil condi-
tions and matters wholly external to the property. °
The decline in the caveat emptor doctrine reflects a change in
societal mores, whereby the goal of consumer protection has re-
placed laissez-faire.' Professor Roberts noted that caveat emptor
did not adversely affect the typical buyer of a new house during
the nineteenth century because the then-typical house owner was
a middle class purchaser who purchased the lot, and then hired an
architect to design the house.3 2
This scenario changed in post-World War II America with the
mass-production of homes during the suburbanization of
America." Courts accordingly recognized caveat emptor no longer
26 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 535 (2d ed. 1955). Dean Prosser referred
to Swinton, and its ilk, as "surely singularly unappetizing cases." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, 738 (5th ed. 1984).
27 Hughes v. Stusser, 415 P.2d 89 (Wash. 1986).
28 See, e.g., Bethahmy v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698, 706 (Idaho 1966) (courts are moving to
a rule which would "impose on parties to a transaction a duty to speak whenever justice,
equity, and fair dealing demand it"); Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 628 (Fla. 1985)
("The law appears to be working toward the ultimate conclusion that full disclosure of all
material facts must be made whenever elementary fair conduct demands it."); Obde v.
Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672, 675 (Wash. 1960) (a duty to disclose "whenever justice, equity
and fair dealing demand it").
29 Eric T. Freyfogle, Real Estate Sales and the New Implied Warranty of Lawful Use,
71 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1985).
30 Id. at 25.
31 Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo. 1979); E. F. Roberts, The
Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 836-
7 (1967).
32 Roberts, supra note 31, at 836 n.1 (1967).
33 As one court acknowledged:
The rule of caveat emptor... apparently worked well in agricultural societies, as
evidenced by its centuries of acceptance. However, the sale of farm acreage cum
simple residence-the type of transaction to which caveat emptor originally ad-
dressed itself-is very different from the sale of a modern home, with complex
plumbing, heating, air conditioning, and electrical systems, which is possibly built
on ground considered unsuitable for construction until recent years.
Wilhite v. Mays, 232 S.E.2d 141, 142-43 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976), affd., 235 S.E.2d 532 (Ga.
1977).
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served the realities of the market place.34 In the 1974 termite in-
festation case of Weintraub v. Krobatsch,35 the New Jersey
Supreme Court acknowledged that even in property law, the focus
is now on the "modern concepts of justice and fair dealing."3 6
Swinton did not represent this court's sense of justice or fair deal-
ing. Even in real estate transactions, the law should be based on
current notions of what is "right and just."3 Finally, Justice
O'Hearn in 1996 quoted precedence for a unanimous New Jersey
Supreme Court in Strawn v. Canuso, in stating caveat emptor no
longer prevails in New Jersey.39 Some courts advocate full disclo-
sure of all material facts whenever elementary fair conduct de-
mands it.4"
The apparent severity of caveat emptor was early tempered
by exceptions for fraud41 and express warranty. 2 More recently,
exceptions have been created for negligent misrepresentation
43
and latent defects. Standard remedies include a choice of rescis-
sion or damages. 4 The common remedies for fraud,45 fraudulent
concealment,46 innocent misrepresentation, 47 and material misrep-
resentation 4' are rescission49 or damages. The concept of fraud, as
developed by the courts, is very expansive.
FRAUD
Fraud may consist of an untrue statement or concealment of a
material fact, accompanied by an intent to deceive. 0 Clearly,
34 See, e.g., Chandler v. Madsen, 642 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Mont. 1982).
35 317 A.2d 68 (N.J. 1974). Sellers, as in Weintraub, often tried to rely on Swinton in
arguing no duty existed to disclose insect infestations. Usually they met with judicial dis-
approval. See, e.g., Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 60 (Wash. 1974).
36 Id. at 75.
37 Id. at 71.
38 Id.; See also Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314, 325 (N.J. 1965).
39 657 A.2d 420, 426, (N.J. 1996) (citing Berman v. Gurwicz, 458 A.2d 1311, 1313 (Ch.
Div. 1981)).
40 Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985).
41 Brooks v. Ervin Construction Co., 116 S.E.2d 454, 457 (N.C. 1960); Bernard v. Kel-
logg, 77 U.S. 383, 388 (1870); Averilla v. Boyer, 87 S.E.2d 259 (W. Va. 1915).
42 Bernard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. 383, 388 (1870). See generally Hamilton, supra note 4,
at 1173.
43 See, e.g., Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church, 389 N.E.2d 623, 625 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
44 See, e.g., Gibb v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 910 (Neb. 1994) (termites).
45 Krall v. Loseke, 461 N.W.2d 67 (Neb. 1990) (termites).
46 Id.
47 See Miller v. Bare, 457 F. Supp. 1359, 1361 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (boundaries) (citing La
Course v. Kiesel, 77 A.2d 877, 879-80 (Pa. 1951)); Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608
(Alaska 1980).
48 Mertens v. Wolfboro National Bank, 402 A.2d 1335 (N.H. 1979).
49 Gordon v. Tafe, 428 A.2d 892 (N.H. 1981); Clauser v. Taylor, 112 P.2d 661, 662 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1941) (affirming the rescission of a transaction to sell property when the buyer
was not informed that the property was filled).
50 See, e.g., Chapman v. Hosek, 475 N.E.2d 593, 598 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
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fraud includes intentional misrepresentations of a material fact.5'
Thus, statements such as telling the purchaser the property is on
a solid lot rather than on nineteen feet of fill constitutes fraud.52
Fraud can consist of misrepresentations regarding flooding,53 ter-
mite infestations,54 or soil conditions.55 A cause of action lies in
fraud when the broker fails to disclose that the property flooded.
Liability was not precluded even though the information about the
flooding was in the public record, and the buyer could have ob-
tained it.56 Denying the existence of a water problem similarly
constitutes fraud. 7 A fraudulent misrepresentation cause of ac-
tion may also exist with respect to off-site conditions that affect
the value of the land involved in the transaction. For example,
New York has held the failure to inform the purchaser of an ob-
noxious business development constitutes fraud.58
A claim for fraudulent misrepresentation does not have to be
based on defendant's knowing the statement was false, but that
the representation was made recklessly and without belief in its
truth.59 A fraudulent misstatement may nullify the defense of ca-
veat emptor even when the misrepresentation occurred after the
signing of the purchase and sale agreement, but prior to execution
of the contract by conveyance of the property. °
Short of fraud in these circumstances, liability might still ex-
ist based upon a theory of negligent misrepresentation.'
Fraud also consists of fraudulent concealment, such as cover-
ing over a defect.62  Thus, fraud exists when the seller suppresses
51 Reliance by a purchaser upon a positive, false, material misrepresentation allows
the purchaser to recover. Burkett v. J.A. Thompson & Sons, 310 P.2d 56, 58 (Cal. App.
1957). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 525 (1989).
52 Rothstein v. Janss Invest. Corp., 113 P.2d 465 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941); See also Len-
gyel v. Lint, 280 S.E.2d 66 (W. Va. 1981) (fraudulent misrepresentation as to the quality
and type of house and the size of the lot).
53 Burkett v. J.A. Thompson & Son, 310 P.2d 56, 58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (vendor
liable for misrepresentation that house was built on original soil rather than fill); Long v.
Brownstone Real Estate Co., 484 A.2d 126, 128 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (seller had a duty to
disclose since buyer was falsely informed the house had never experienced flooding).
54 Homer v. Ahern, 153 S.E.2d 216 (Va. 1967); Lyons v. McDonald, 501 N.E.2d 1079
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986); May v. Hopkinson, 347 S.E.2d 508 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986); Lynn v.
Taylor, 642 P.2d 131 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982).
55 Krause v. Miller, 300 P.2d 855 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
56 Chapman v. Hosek, 475 N.E.2d 593 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
57 Davis v. Sellers, 443 S.E.2d 879 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
58 Coral Gables, Inc. v. Mayer, 271 N.Y.S. 662 (N.Y. App. Div. 1934).
59 See, e.g., Roberts v. James, 85 A. 244 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1912); O'Leary v. Indus-
trial Park Corp., 542 A.2d 333, 336 (Conn. Ct. App. 1988); Ollerman v. O'Rourke, 288
N.W.2d 95, 107 (Wis. 1980).
60 Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 627 (Fla. 1985).
61 Powell v. Wold, 362 S.E.2d 796 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
62 The RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 555 covers fraudulent concealment:
One party to a transaction who by concealment or other action intentionally pre-
vents the other from acquiring material information is subject to the same liability
to the other, for pecuniary loss as though he had stated the nonexistence of the
matter that the other was thus prevented from discovering.
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a serious problem with the property which the purchaser would
have no reason to suspect.63 For example, fraudulent concealment
can deal with the salinity of the soil.' When the potential pur-
chaser asks a question, there is a duty to answer truthfully. Ca-
veat emptor is not a defense to fraudulent concealment.65
More significantly, fraud may be based on mere nondisclo-
sure: "silent fraud." Actionable fraud or misrepresentations may
exist through concealment or failure to disclose a hidden condition
or a material fact where a duty of disclosure exists.66 Silent fraud
has a long heritage. For example, in 1886 the Michigan Supreme
Court stated "a fraud arising from the suppression of the truth is
as prejudicial as that which springs from the assertion of a false-
hood."67 A 1924 Nebraska case, O'Shea v. Morris,6" held the fail-
ure to disclose nonownership of an adjacent vacant lot, upon
which the seller's improvements extended, was fraudulent. Fail-
ure to disclose known facts, coupled with a request or circum-
stances which require a duty to speak, may form the essence of
fraudulent misrepresentation.69 In other words, caveat emptor is
inapplicable when passive concealment exists.70
A purchaser may justifiably rely upon the knowledge, skill
and expertise of the vendor.71 Accordingly, the purchaser should
have a reasonable expectation of honesty in the marketplace. The
vendor should therefore disclose material facts of which it is
aware, and which otherwise are not readily discoverable.72 The
purpose behind this rule is to protect the purchaser, who is in a
poor position to discover conditions which are not readily
discoverable. 3
Even if no duty to disclose otherwise exists, a seller must an-
swer truthfully any questions from the buyer, and not engage in
partial disclosures. If the seller starts to disclose, he must disclose
fully so that the purchaser is not misled by the partial disclo-
sures."4 A cause of action may exist for misrepresentation even if
the seller is acting under an honest mistake without any intent to
63 Burkett v. J.A. Thompson and Sons, 310 P.2d 56, 58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957). For ex-
ample, fraudulent concealment may consist of masking, by deodorizers, the strong odor of
dog urine permeating most of the carpets in the house. Campbell v. Booth, 526 S.W.2d 167
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
64 Griffith v. Byers Construction Co. of Kansas, Inc., 510 P.2d 198 (Kan. 1973).
65 Loghry v. Capel, 132 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1965).
66 Kaze v. Compton, 283 S.W.2d 204, 207 (Ky. 1955).
67 Tompkins v. Hollister, 27 N.W. 651 (Mich. 1886).
68 198 N.W. 866 (Neb. 1924).
69 O'Leary v. Industrial Park Corp., 542 A.2d 333, 337 (Conn. Ct. App. 1988).
70 Holcombe v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1985).
71 Ollerman v. O'Rourke, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 95, 107 (Wis. 1980).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Beirman v. Richmond Homes, Ltd., 821 P.2d 913 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Catucci v.
Ouellette, 592 A.2d 962 (Conn. Ct. App. 1991); Nei v. Burley, 446 N.E.2d 674 (Mass. 1983).
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discuss the quality or quantity of the land.7" Thus, even innocent
misrepresentations may render the seller liable to the purchaser.76
LATENT DEFECT
A more recent exception to caveat emptor is the duty to dis-
close latent defects, known to the seller, and which substantially
affect the value or habitability of the property, but which are un-
known to the purchaser, and would not be discovered by a reason-
ably diligent inspection.7" The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353
provides:
(1) a vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his ven-
dee any condition, whether natural or artificial, which in-
volves unreasonable risk to persons on the land, is subject to
liability to the vendee and others . . . , if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know of the
condition or the risk involved, and
(b) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condition,
and realizes or should realize the risk involved, and has
reason to believe that the vendee will not discover the
condition or realize the risk.7"
One court listed the following elements as persuasive on the duty
to disclose known facts:
(1) the condition is latent and not readily observable by the
purchaser;
(2) the purchaser acts upon the reasonable assumption that the
condition does (or does not) exist;
(3) the vendor has special knowledge or means of knowledge not
available to the purchaser; and
(4) the existence of the condition is material to the
transaction."v
Liability for the nondisclosure may extend to both the seller and
the seller's broker.80 The Florida Supreme Court extends the duty
to all forms of real property, new and used."1 The duty to disclose
latent defects is especially well established in cases involving ter-
mite infestations, 2 soil defects, 3 and construction on filled land.'
75 Tennant v. Lawton, 615 P.2d 1305 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
76 Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608 (Alaska 1980); Soursby v. Hankin, 763 P.2d 725
(Or. 1988).
77 Miles v. McSwegin, 388 N.E.2d 1367 (Ohio 1979); Thacker v. Tyree, 297 S.E.2d
885, 888 (W. Va. 1982); Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Ct. App. 1963).
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1977).
79 Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., Inc., 288 N.W.2d 95, 106 (Wis. 1980).
so Miles v. McSwegin, 388 N.E.2d 1367 (Ohio 1979). Even if not specifically asked,
there may be a duty to describe the possibility of termites. Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d
672 (Wash. 1960).
81 Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1985).
82 Miles v. McSwegin, 388 N.E.2d 1367 (Ohio 1979); Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115, 1120
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Godfrey v. Steinpress, 180 Cal. Rptr. 95 (Ct. App. 1982); Lingsch v.
19981
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In addition, for some courts, the nondisclosure of a material
fact may constitute fraud 5 or deceit.8 8
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
The implied warranty of habitability in the sale of homes has
become a well-recognized exception to the rule of caveat emptor
The essence of the warranty is that the seller will transfer to the
purchaser a house suitable for habitation. " The development of
this implied warranty has been breathtaking.8 9 The mass produc-
tion of housing had become analogous to the manufacture and
marketing of chattels. Yet, as late as 1965, Professor Haskell
found that, except for Louisiana, Colorado, and New Jersey in new
construction, there was in essence no implied warranty of
"merchantability" in the sale of real property.90
Warranties to protect the purchaser of personal property de-
veloped early in the twentieth century. The resulting difference in
the treatment of personalty and realty resulted in Professor Has-
kell noticing the law "offer[ed] greater protection to the purchaser
Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 207 (Ct. App. 1963). Recovery may be based upon theories of
fraud, Lyons v. McDonald, 501 N.E.2d 1079, 1081 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Lynn v. Taylor, 642
P.2d 131, 135 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982); Homer v. Ahern, 153 S.E.2d 216, 221-22 (Va. 1967);
consumer fraud and deceptive business practices statutes, Soniat v. Johnson-Rast & Hays,
626 So. 2d 1256, 1258 (Ala. 1993) (failure to fully produce evidence of old termite damage);
Warren v. LeMay, 491 N.E.2d 464, 473 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); and fraudulent concealment,
Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672, 676 (Wash. 1960). In addition to the standard recovery
of damages, a court might grant rescission in an appropriate case. See, e.g., Gordon v. Tafe,
428 A.2d 892, 894 (N.H. 1981) (upholding rescission following discovery that house was
infested by termites); Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68, 74 (N.J. 1974) (reversing sum-
mary judgment against rescission where defendant vendor failed to disclose roach
infestation).
83 Loghry v. Capel, 132 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Iowa 1965); Cohen v. Vivian, 349 P.2d 366,
367 (Colo. 1960); Hills v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Brauchitsch v.
Cravens, 604 P.2d 379 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979); Sorrell v. Young, 491 P.2d 1312, 1315-16
(Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (even if purchaser might make an inspection of the property).
84 See, e.g., Clauser v. Taylor, 112 P.2d 661, 662 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941); Loghry v. Capel,
132 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Iowa 1965) ("One who sells real estate knowing of a soil defect, pat-
ent to him, latent to the purchaser, is required to disclose the soil defect.").
85 Loghry v. Capel, 132 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Iowa 1965); Cohen v. Vivian, 349 P.2d 366,
367 (Colo. 1960); Hills v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
86 Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Ct. App. 1963).
87 See Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654, 656 n.2 (Fla. 1983), and the cases cited
therein.
88 Chandler v. Madsen, 642 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Mont. 1982); Yepsen v. Burgess, 525
P.2d 1019, 1022 (Or. 1974).
89 Changes in property laws have traditionally developed slowly. The adoption of the
implied warranty of habitability to home contractors is a phenomenon of the late 1950s and
early 1960s. Case Note, Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc.: Extending the Implied Warranty of
Habitability to Subsequent Purchasers - An Honorable Result Based on Unsound Theory, 35
BAYLOR L. REv. 670, 674 (1983).
90 Paul G. Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Prop-
erty, 53 GEO. L.J. 633 (1965).
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of a seventy-nine cent dog leash than it [did] to the purchaser of a
$40,000 house."91
The leading decision establishing the implied warranty is the
1965 New Jersey case of Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.92 A child
was severely burned by a defective hot water heater. Defendant
pioneered the mass production of homes after World War II. The
New Jersey Supreme Court expressly rejected caveat emptor as a
defense by a builder/vendor:
Caveat emptor developed when the buyer and seller were in an
equal bargaining position and they could readily be expected to
protect themselves in the deed. Buyers of mass produced devel-
opment homes are not in an equal footing with the builder ven-
dors and are no more able to protect themselves in the deed
than are automobile purchasers in a position to protect them-
selves in the bill of sale. 3
New Jersey subsequently extended Schipper to a small-scale
builder of new homes in McDonald v. Mianecki.94 The McDonald
opinion echoed the themes of Professor Haskell and the Schipper
case by recognizing the purchase of a home is often the most im-
portant transaction of a lifetime for the average family.s5 In addi-
tion, the parties often possess a disporportionality of bargaining
power since the average buyer lacks the skill and expertise neces-
sary to make an adequate inspection.s6 The developer will often
possess superior bargaining power, a greater expertise in assess-
ing the risks as well as the expertise necessary to construct a liva-
ble dwelling.97 The Schipper case was quickly followed by other
jurisdictions,9" and is now widely adopted in the United States.99
For many courts, a key factor in adopting the implied war-
ranty of habitability is that the purchaser may justifiably rely
upon the knowledge, skill and expertise of the vendor. 100 Purchas-
91 Id.
92 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965). The trend actually began in the 1957 Ohio case of
Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 140 N.E.2d 819 (Ohio 1957), which held the builders of a home owe
to the purchaser an implied warranty that the dwelling is fit for human habitation.
93 Id. at 326.
94 398 A.2d 1283 (N.J. 1979).
95 Id. at 1292.
96 Id. at 1289.
97 Id. at 1290.
98 See, e.g., Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc., 154 N.W.2d 803 (S.D. 1967);
Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 175 S.E.2d 792
(S.C. 1970).
99 See, e.g., Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1969).
oo Briarcliffe W. Townhouse Owners Ass'n v. Wiseman Constr. Co., 454 N.E.2d 363,
365 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); DeRoche v. Dame, 430 N.Y.S.2d, 390 (App. Div.), app. dismissed
413 N.E.2d 366 (1980). See generally Eric T. Freyfogle, Real Estate Sales and the Implied
Warranty of Lawful Use, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19 (1985) (discussing the superiority of the
seller's knowledge concerning a property's characteristics and limitations over that of the
buyer).
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ers of homes, just as purchasers of chattels, expect the purchase to
be free of defects. The ordinary purchaser is unable to detect
flaws in the construction of modern homes. 10 1 Similarly, purchas-
ers may often not recognize natural conditions which pose a
threat, such as unstable slopes. °2 On the other hand, a reason-
able builder should make a site inspection before building and dis-
cover the dangers of the area.' °3 In addition, the typical family
purchasing a house must often do so within tight time constraints
imposed by career demands, 104 and thus may not have time to
thoroughly inspect the house and its surrounding areas.
The builder/vendor is in a better position to guard against de-
fects in the home, and, if necessary, to protect against potential
but unknown defects in the site.10 Indeed, the developer has the
opportunity to examine the suitability of the site for development,
the expertise to assess its suitability, and the ability to utilize ap-
propriate construction methods to make it safe for habitation. Li-
ability is also premised upon the superior knowledge, skill and
expertise of the developer in the construction of a house. 6
In reality, the warranty of habitability substantially overlaps
basic tort concepts of negligence. For example, builders should
use reasonable care in designing and constructing a house on in-
adequately compacted earth, which results in land subsidence, °7
or upon unstable and filled ground, containing an underground
spring, without providing adequate drainage, resulting in land-
slide damage.10s The common law corollary to the implied war-
ranty of habitability is that a reasonable builder has to ascertain
the soil conditions and water table of a construction site.109 Fail-
ure to provide a safe location for a residential structure may con-
stitute negligence. 10 The builder has a duty to use reasonable
care to determine whether lots are fit for their intended use."' In
short, the developer has a duty to select a safe site for
construction.12
lOl Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654, 658 (Fla. 1983).
102 Id. at 1289. See also ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 932 (Wyo. 1981).
103 Id. at 938.
104 Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654, 659 (Fla. 1983).
105 Elderkin v. Gaster, 288 A.2d 771, 777 (Pa. 1972).
106 George v. Leach, 313 S.E.2d 920, 923 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
107 Sabella v. Wisler, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Cal. 1963).
io8 Conolley v. Bull, 65 Cal. Rptr. 689, 697 (Ct. App. 1968); House v. Thornton, 457
P.2d 199, 204 (Wash. 1969).
1o9 See, e.g., McFeeters v. Renollet, 500 P.2d 47, 53 (Kan. 1972); Baranowski v. Strat-
ing, 250 N.W.2d 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977); Conolley v. Bull, 65 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Ct. App.
1968).
11o ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 938 (Wyo. 1981).
ill Beri, Inc. v. Salishan Properties, Inc., 580 P.2d 173, 176 (Or. 1978).
112 ABC Builders, Inc., 632 P.2d at 935.
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Similarly, in Conolley v. Bull,"3 the California Court of Ap-
peals held a real estate developer liable for building a house on
sloping ground. A neighbor had previously warned the developer
that a slide had occurred on his property some time earlier, and
provided the developer with an engineer's report indicating that
underground movement of subsurface water caused slides to occur
in the area. A landslide subsequently occurred, resulting in the
near loss of the house. The developer was held liable in negligence
for failure to carefully investigate the soil conditions before build-
ing on hillside lots. For such a cause of action based on negli-
gence, such as negligent construction, caveat emptor would not be
a defense." 4
The duty of reasonable care will often include soil bearing
tests."5 The stability of the foundation is vital to a dwelling." 6
Core drillings and engineering studies can detect slope instabil-
ity.117 Similarly, special testing should be performed on lands
fronting on inland lakes because the soil is often unsuitable for
supporting structures."'
An additional reason for adapting the implied warranty of
habitability is to encourage developers to utilize due care in siting
and construction. In a 1968 decision rejecting caveat emptor in
the sale of a new home, the Texas Supreme Court reasoned:
The caveat emptor rule as applied to new houses is an anachro-
nism patently out of harmony with modern home-buying prac-
tices. It does a disservice not only to the ordinary prudent
purchaser, but to the industry itself by lending encouragement
to the unscrupulous, fly-by-night operator and purveyor of
shoddy work." 9
Thus, in creating an implied warranty of habitability, the
question is not one of fault or wrongdoing, but which of two inno-
cent parties is in a better position to prevent the harm. 2 ° The
practical effect of the implied warranty of habitability is often to
impose strict liability on the builder.'2 ' The purpose is to protect
the purchaser, who cannot protect himself, such as being unable
to dig up the ground to inspect the sewage system.'22
113 65 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Ct. App. 1968).
114 Sabella v. Wisler, 377 P.2d 889, 893 (Cal. 1963).
115 Baranoski v. Strating, 250 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
116 House v. Thorton, 457 P.2d 199, 203 (Wash. 1969).
117 See, e.g., ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 932 (Wyo. 1981).
118 Id.
119 Hummer v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 562 (Tex. 1968).
120 Chandler v. Madsen, 642 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Mont. 1982).
121 See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965); Patitucci v. Drelich,
379 A.2d 297 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977) (inadequate septic sewage system).
122 Patitucci v. Drelich, 379 A.2d 297 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977).
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Breach of warranty is established by proof of a defect which
substantially impairs the enjoyment of the residence,'23 such as
the lack of a potable water supply,'24 insect infestations, 12 5 or a
septic tank or system placed in a high water table.
12 6
Furthermore, the implied warranty of habitability covers not
only structural defects in the building, but also extends to the un-
suitable nature of the site.'27 Liability thereby exists for condi-
tions underlying the property, such as a filled-in quarry, 2 ' or
sanitary landfill and garbage dump.'29 The unsuitability of the
site on which the house is built constitutes a breach of war-
ranty. 131 Implied warranties also include the septic system.13' A
duty thereby exists to disclose these conditions to the purchaser.
3 2
In Village Development Co. v. Filice,33 the Nevada Supreme
Court held the developers liable for failing to warn the buyer of a
lot in the Lake Tahoe basin of the risks associated with the lot
being in the floodplain of a mountain stream. The opinion relied
upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 353 because the devel-
oper had knowledge of the risks involved, but the purchaser could
neither discover the condition nor realize the risk.
In Strawn v. Canuso,3 the New Jersey Supreme Court held a
duty exists for builder-developers to disclose off-site conditions to
purchasers. The developer knew of the existence of a nearby haz-
ardous waste landfill, but refused to disclose the information to
prospective purchasers. The court stated in a critical passage:
We hold that a builder-developer of residential real estate or a
broker representing it is not only liable to a purchaser for af-
firmative and intentional misrepresentation, but is also liable
for nondisclosure of off-site physical conditions known to it and
unknown and not readily observable by the buyer if existence of
those conditions is of sufficient materiality to affect the habita-
bility, use, or enjoyment of the property and therefore, render
123 Waggoner Construction Co. v. Noonan, 403 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Ind. 1980).
124 Elderkin v. Gaster, 288 A.2d 771 (Pa. 1972); McDonald v. Mianecki, 398 A.2d 1283
(N.J. 1979); Lyon v. Ward, 221 S.E.2d 727 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976).
125 Weintraub v. Krobatsu, 317 A.2d 68 (N.J. 1974); Oble v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672
(Wash. 1960).
126 Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 175 S.E.2d 792 (S.C. 1970).
127 Elderkin v. Gaster, 288 A.2d 771 (Pa. 1972); Jordan v. Talaga, 532 N.E.2d 1174,
1183 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Hesson v. Walmsley Constr. Co., 422 So. 2d 943, 944 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982); Lehmann v. Arnold, 484 N.E.2d 473, 476-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
128 Sabella v. Wisler, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (Cal. 1963) (no compaction of the filled-in pit).
129 Westwood Development Co. v. Esponge, 342 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
130 See Lehmann v. Arnold, 484 N.E.2d 473, 476 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
131 George v. Veach, 313 S.E.2d 920 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
132 See, e.g., Sorrell v. Young, 491 P.2d 1312 (Wash. Ct. App. 1954) (lot was developed
on fill).
133 526 P.2d 83 (Nev. 1974).
134 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995).
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the property substantially less desirable or valuable to the ob-
jectively reasonable buyer. 135
Strawn deals with professional builders and their brokers, who
possess a level of sophistication that most home buyers lack.
136
With that knowledge, the sellers "have a duty to disclose to home
buyers the location of off-site physical conditions that an objec-
tively reasonable and informed buyer would deem material to the
transaction."37 Critical to the reasoning in Strawn are two fac-
tors: the difference in bargaining power between the professional
seller of residential real estate and the purchaser of the housing,
and the differences in access to information between the seller and
the buyer. 138
The duration of the builder-developer implicit warranty of fit-
ness for habitation is measured by "reasonableness."139 Some
states have taken the implied warranty of habitability to the next
level and imposed a standard of strict liability upon builders. 4 °
PRIVITY OF CONTRACT AND SUCCESSOR PURCHASERS
Once the warranty of habitability was widely accepted, the
next issue became whether the warranty would run with the prop-
erty, or be limited to the purchaser who lies in privity of contract.
The warranty was soon extended to subsequent purchasers."'
Privity of contract is no longer a limitation on recovery.
In 1977, the Connecticut Supreme Court allowed a subse-
quent purchaser to bring a negligence suit against the builder for
the failure of a septic system.'42 Privity was not a limitation on
recovery because the cause of action lay in Tort and not Con-
tract.'43 The Connecticut case has been widely followed.'
135 Id. at 431.
136 Id. at 432.
137 Id. The court also stated: "[I]t is reasonable to extend to... professionals a... duty
to disclose off-site conditions that materially affect the value or desirability of the prop-
erty." Id. at 428.
138 Id.
139 Wagner Construction Co. v. Noonan, 403 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Ind. 1980).
140 See, e.g., Krieger v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (Ct. App. 1969). An ap-
pellate tribunal has recognized emotional distress as an additional remedy in construction
defect cases. Salka v. Dean Homes of Beverly Hills, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902 (Ct. App.
1993) (case involved flooding due to construction on a defective foundation).
141 See, e.g., Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979); Barnes v. Mac
Brown & Co., 342 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. 1976); Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168
(Tex. 1983).
142 Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 378 A.2d 599 (Conn. 1977).
143 Id. at 602. But see Real Estate Marketing, Inc. v. Franz, 885 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1994).
144 Lempke v. Dagenais, 547 A.2d 290 (N.H. 1988) (overruling a decision decided just
two years earlier); Ellis v. Robert C. Morris, Inc., 513 A.2d 951 (N.H. 1986); Steinberg v.
Coda Robertson Constr. Co., 440 P.2d 798 (N.M. 1968); Oates v. JAG, Inc., 333 S.E.2d 222
(N.C. 1985); Leigh v. Wadsworth, 361 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1961); Terlinde v. Neely, 271 S.E.2d
768 (S.C. 1980); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979).
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Other courts have extended strict liability protection to subse-
quent purchasers. 45 The mass production and sale of homes was
analogized to the mass production and sale of automobiles. 4
Courts have also utilized other theories to circumvent the ancient
privity limitations. For example, in a cause of action in Tort, such
as for misrepresentation, privity of contract is not a shield.147 A
false representation may consist of the failure to disclose a mate-
rial fact which should have been disclosed. 4 Similarly, a cause of
action for fraudulent concealment may extend to subsequent
purchasers. 149
BROKER LIABILITY
Assuming caveat emptor protects the vendor, a purchaser
might seek to hold the broker liable instead. Brokers face a con-
flict because they have a fiduciary duty to their principal, the
owner, to use their best efforts to sell the property at the highest
price. In addition, their commission is usually a percentage of the
sale price. Disclosure to a potential purchaser of information that
could delay the sale, or lower the sale price, could arguably result
in a breach of the broker's duty, as well as a reduction in the sales
commission. Thus, in the short-run, the broker's self-interest is to
maximize the sales price by minimizing the negatives. However,
the broker's duty is not unbridled and must be fulfilled in compli-
ance with legal requirements. For example, the broker will be lia-
ble for fraud or misrepresentation in consummating a sale.
Nevertheless, brokers, as well as sellers, were protected by
the defense of caveat emptor 5 ° However, the caveat emptor de-
fense of brokers disintegrated rapidly in the second half of the
twentieth century. Indeed, as one commentator remarked:
Broker liability has increased at nearly an exponential rate as
many state courts and consumer protection statutes require a
broker to disclose any information that materially relates to a
buyer's decision to purchase property. 5'
145 Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., Inc., 612 S.W.2d 321 (Ark. 1981); Kreigler v. Eichler
Homes, Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (Ct. App. 1969).
146 Id. at 324.
147 Schnell v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 850, 852 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (failure to disclose
uranium mine tailings under the house).
148 Id.
149 Barnhouse v. City of Pinole, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881, 893-94 (Ct. App. 1982).
150 See, e.g., Traverse v. Long, 135 N.E.2d 256 (Ohio 1956).
151 Paula C. Williams, Aids, Ghosts, Murder: Must Real Estate Brokers and Sellers Dis-
close, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689 (1992). In reality, brokers are subject to at least the
same rules of disclosure as are imposed upon sellers. See, e.g., Cooper v. Jevne, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 725 (Ct. App. 1976); Rayner v. Wise Realty Co., 504 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987);
Miles v. McSwegin, 388 N.E.2d 1367 (Ohio 1979); Lock v. Schreppler, 426 A.2d 856 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1981).
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Real estate brokers are often held liable on a variety of theories,
including fraud, negligent misrepresentation, innocent misrepre-
sentation, negligence, 52  and consumer fraud and protection
statutes.153
While we think of a cause of action for fraud being based upon
an intentional misrepresentation of a material fact, a case of
fraudulent representation may lie against a broker if the broker
makes representations without knowledge as to the truth or fal-
sity of the representations. 4 Even half-truths, or partial disclo-
sures, may give rise to liability by a broker. 5 A broker also has a
duty to answer truthfully the questions asked by a prospective
purchaser. 156
A broker can be liable for misrepresenting the acreage and
amount of road and river frontage of rental property.157 Liability
can be based upon strict liability if the speaker professes, or im-
plies, personal knowledge.' 58
Listing brokers know, or should know, their descriptions will
be relied upon by others. Thus, a duty is owed to all those who
rely on the listing characterizations. Consequently, if the broker
fails to exercise reasonable care in gaining knowledge of defects in
the listed property, a cause of action may exist for negligent mis-
representation.159 If the broker has actual knowledge of a defect,
the cause of action may lie in fraud.160 If negligent misrepresenta-
tion is the cause of action, then it is unwise for brokers to commu-
nicate or volunteer unverified material information that turns out
152 Easton v. Strassberger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Ct. App. 1984); Gouveia v. Citicorp
Person-to-Person Fin. Center, 686 P.2d 262 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984); Secor v. Knight, 716
P.2d 790 (Utah 1986).
153 See, e.g., Warren v. Le May, 491 N.E.2d 464 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
154 The Ohio Supreme Court has reasoned that where one asserts a fact, when he has
insufficient information to justify it, he may be found to have the intent to deceive. Pum-
phrey v. Quillen, 135 N.E.2d 328, 330 (Ohio 1956); see also Luikart v. Miller, 48 S.W.2d
867 (Mo. 1932); Mertens v. Wolfeboro Nat. Bank, 402 A.2d 1335 (N.H. 1974); see also
Spargnapani v. Wright, 110 A.2d 82 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1954); Ackmann v. Keeney-Joelle
Real Estate Co., 401 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. 1966).
155 See, e.g., Revitz v. Terrell, 572 So. 2d 996 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990); Fennell Realty Co. v.
Martin, 529 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Ala. 1988).
156 Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982); Fennell Realty Co. v. Martin, 529
So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Ala. 1988).
157 Gauerke v. Rozga, 332 N.W.2d 804 (Wis. 1983).
158 Id. at 804.
159 Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Financial Ctr., Inc., 686 P.2d 262, 265-66
(N.M. Ct. App. 1984). Section 552 of the RESTATEMENT is critical:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuni-
ary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he
fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
16o Gouveia, supra note 159, at 266.
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to be incorrect. 161 Liability may lie for negligent misrepresenta-
tion even if the belief is sincere or honest.162
Pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,6 ' a broker
may even be liable for innocent misrepresentations of material
facts relied upon by the purchaser. 6  The purchaser has a right to
rely upon representations made by the broker. 165 Indeed, the loss
should fall on the innocent defendant rather than the innocent
victim, who justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation. 166
A broker also has a duty to disclose material facts of which
the broker is aware or should have been aware.' 6 ' Thus, a real
estate broker may owe a duty to a prospective buyer of residential
property to disclose any material defect which might affect the
purchaser's decision to buy the property.'68
The broker's duty of disclosure may be the same as the
seller's. The seller and broker may in turn be jointly and severally
liable to the purchaser for the full amount of damages.'69 In addi-
tion, if the material misrepresentation is made by the agent, the
purchaser has a right of rescission. 10
EASTON v STRASSBERGER
The leading case involving a duty to disclose off-site condi-
tions on real estate brokers is the California appellate decision in
Easton v. Strassberger."' The buyer purchased a 3,000 square
foot house on an acre of land for $170,000. Shortly after the close
161 See, e.g., Tennant v. Lawton, 615 P.2d 1305 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980); Mertens v.
Wolfboro Nat. Bank, 402 A.2d 1335 (N.H. 1979); see also Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 752
(Alaska 1982).
162 Rodgers v. Johnson, 557 So. 2d 1136 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
163 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C(1) provides:
One who, in a sale, rental or exchange transaction with another, makes a misrep-
resentation of a material fact for the purpose of inducing the other to act or to
refrain from acting in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other for pecuni-
ary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, even
though it is not made fraudulently or negligently.
164 See, e.g., Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982); Spargnapani v. Wright,
110 A.2d 82 (D.C. Mun. App. Ct. 1954); Buzzaro v. Bolger, 453 N.E.2d 1129 (Ill. App. Ct.
1983); Berryman v. Riegert, 175 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. 1970); Polk Terrace, Inc. v. Harper,
386 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980);
Bergmueller v. Minnick, 383 S.E.2d 722 (Va. 1989); Gauerke v. Rozga, 332 N.W.2d 804
(Wis. 1983); Reda v. Sincaban, 426 N.W.2d 100 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988); app. denied 430
N.W.2d 918 (Wis. 1988).
165 Berryman v. Riegert, 175 N.W.2d 438, 442-43 (Minn. 1970).
166 Id.
167 Johnson v. Geer Real Estate Co., 720 P.2d 660 (Kan. 1986); Connor v. Merrill
Lynch Realty, Inc., 581 N.E.2d 196, 201 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Roberts v. Estate of Babba-
gallo, 531 A.2d 1125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (urea foam formaldehyde insulation.)
168 De Candia v. Barry, 1989 Mass. App. Div. 92, 94-95 (1989).
169 Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205 (Ct. App. 1963).
170 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 259.
171 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Ct. App. 1984).
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of escrow, a massive earth movement damaged the property.'72
The sellers had concealed from the buyers and agents two slides
over the preceding three years. 7 3 The slides occurred because por-
tions of the property were on fill that had not been properly engi-
neered and compacted. The house was appraised at $170,000 in
undamaged condition, but only $20,000 with the damage. The es-
timated costs of repair were as high as $213,000.1" The brokers
had inspected the property, but did not notice the slides. How-
ever, sufficient clues, "red flags," were available that should have
alerted the brokers of the soil problems.'75
The broker was held liable for negligence. The purchaser did
not have to show either intentional misrepresentation or fraudu-
lent concealment, but simple negligence. The court held a broker
has a duty to not only disclose known facts, but also to conduct a
reasonably diligent inspection of the property:
[WIe hold that the duty of a real estate broker representing the
seller, to disclose facts.., includes the affirmative duty to con-
duct a reasonably competent and diligent inspection of the resi-
dential property listed for sale and to declare to prospective
purchasers all facts materially affecting the value or desirability
of the property that such an investigation would reveal. 7 '
The court recognized policy arguments for invoking a duty of in-
spection on the broker. First, the court acknowledged the policy
from earlier California cases to protect the buyer from unethical
brokers and sellers, and to ensure the buyer is provided sufficient
accurate information to make an informed decision. 177 In addition,
the law should not create a disincentive for seller's broker to make
a diligent inspection. 17 The broker is also most frequently the
best situated party to obtain and provide the most reliable infor-
mation on the property.179
Easton was followed by a few jurisdictions.8 s For example,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held a broker had a duty to investi-
gate whether there had been a problem from water seepage into
172 Id. at 385.
173 Id. at 386.
174 Id. at 385.
175 These clues included netting on a slope by the house, and uneven floors in the guest
house. Id. at 386.
176 Id. at 390.
177 Id. at 388.
178 Id.
179 Id.
1so See, e.g., Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin. Center, 686 P.2d 262 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1984); Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790 (Utah 1986). See also Gauerke v. Rozga, 332
N.W.2d 804 (Wis. 1983).
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the home or property. Such information should be available to an
experienced real estate broker."' 1
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO EASTON
The California legislature subsequently clarified the broker's
duty of inspection and disclosure for dwellings of one to four
units :182
It is the duty of a real estate broker.., to conduct a reasonably
competent and diligent visual inspection of the property offered
for sale and to disclose to that prospective purchaser all facts
materially affecting the value or desirability of the property that
such an investigation would reveal . 1.8..3
The inspection need not include areas that are reasonably and
normally inaccessible to such an inspection."8 The requisite stan-
dard of care is that which "a reasonably prudent real estate licen-
see would exercise and is measured by the degree of knowledge
through education, experience, and examination, required to ob-
tain a license.... 185
STATUTORY CONSTRAINTS ON CAVEAT EMPTOR
Caveat emptor also has been severely limited through legisla-
tive enactments that require disclosures of specified conditions
such as asbestos,186 lead paint,187 termites,8 8 septic systems, 8 9 the
presence of smoke detectors, and toxic contamination.19 ° Many
states have also enacted more general disclosure laws.
California led the way in 1985 by enacting the country's first
Homeowner Disclosure Act.1 91 The California statute requires
both the seller and any brokers involved in the transaction to sign
the prescribed disclosure form. The brokers must certify they
have conducted a reasonably competent and diligent visual in-
181 Berryman v. Riegert, 175 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. 1970); see also, Sawyer v. Tildahl, 148
N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 1967); Long v. Brownstone Real Estate Co., 484 A.2d 126 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1984).
182 CAL. CIv. CODE § 2079.1 (West 1998).
183 Id. § 2079.
184 Id. § 2079.3.
185 Id. § 2079.2.
186 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102-6(c)(1) (Deering Supp. 1997). A cause of action lies
in fraud when the broker failed to disclose that the property was subject to flooding. Chap-
man v. Hosek, 475 N.E.2d 593 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
187 See 40 C.F.R. § 745 (1997)
188 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 482.226(1) (1998).
189 Massachusetts enacted a statute, commonly referred to as Title V, which requires
homeowners with septic systems to meet new inspection standards before they can sell or
expand their houses. MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 15.00 et seq. (1997).
190 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25359.7(a) (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 22a-134a-d, 22a-452a (1998).
191 This statute was enacted after the California Court of Appeals decision in Easton v.
Strassberger. See notes 171-180, supra, and accompanying text.
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spection of the accessible areas of the property.192 The statute also
codifies the disclosure form to be completed by the seller and deliv-
ered to the purchaser.19
3
Under the California statute, the seller must disclose known
existing defects in fixtures and appliances on the property,194
known defects in the structure of the home,'95 defects in the prop-
erty or matters affecting the property, 9 6 and neighborhood noise
problems or other nuisances. 97 The seller must answer "yes" or
"no" to a series of questions. If an answer is "yes," then the seller
must explain the circumstances. A significant limitation in the
statute is that the disclosure requirement applies only to past or
existing damage from external geologic causes. The statute does
not require disclosure of prospective threats. 9 '
The California Court of Appeals in Alexander v. McKnight'99
recognized the purpose of the statute requires it to "be liberally
interpreted so that a buyer will be fully informed on matters af-
fecting the value of the property to be purchased."20 0 The court
noted the earlier Reed v. King201 decision to the effect that "the
failure to disclose a negative fact when it can reasonably be said to
have a foreseeably depressive affect [sic] on the value of property
is tortious."2°2 The court uttered this strong statement about ca-
veat emptor: "If anything, the concept of 'let the buyer beware' is
an anachronism in California having little or no application in
real estate law."20 3
In light of California's concern over earthquakes, special dis-
closure rules govern seismic risks:
A person who is acting as an agent for a seller of real property
which is located within a seismic hazard zone ... or the seller if
he or she is acting without an agent, shall disclose to any pro-
spective purchaser the fact that the property is located within a
seismic hazard zone .... 204
The disclosure duty may be satisfied through the real estate trans-
fer disclaimer statement, the local option real estate transfer dis-
192 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.6 (1998).
193 Id.
194 The required information includes fill, settling from any cause, flooding, drainage,
or grading problems, and any major damage caused by fire, earthquake, floods or land-




198 Id. § 1102.5.
199 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453 (Ct. App. 1992).
200 Id. at 455.
201 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1983).
202 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 456.
203 Id.
204 CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 2694(a) (1993).
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claimer statement, or the real estate contract and receipt for
deposit. °5 California followed up in 1990 by legislatively creating
a statewide seismic hazard and technical advisory program. °6
A critical provision of the statute provides that, when infor-
mation on a seismic hazard zone is "reasonably available," the
seller, or agent acting for the seller, shall disclose to a prospective
purchaser that the property is located within a seismic hazard
zone. 20 7 The phrase "reasonably available" is defined to mean
"that for any county that includes areas covered by seismic hazard
maps, a notice is posted at the offices of the county recorder,
county assessor, and county planning commission identifying the
location of the maps and the effective date of the notice."2 °8
Many states have followed the California model in enacting
homeowner disclosure laws.20 9 These disclosure laws now provide
the standards and procedures of disclosure in real estate transac-
tions in many states.
The statutes commonly require the seller to provide a de-
tailed description of the condition of the property, including
known physical defects in homes, and cover items such as water
supply, sewage system, basement/crawl space, structural compo-
nents, mechanical systems, insect infestation, presence of hazard-
ous substances, code violations, and underground storage tanks.
Flooding, drainage, settling or grading problems are often covered
by the statutes.
The gist of the statutory scheme is fairly uniform, but varia-
tions exist as to the form, the required disclosures, the liability of
brokers, and the possibility of a disclaimer. Some states, like Cali-
fornia, prescribe the disclosure form.210 Many provide for an up-
date if a condition changes before the close. 21 The purpose and
effect of the property disclosure statutes are that brokers "know"
the property they are selling.
205 Id. § 2694(b)(1)-(3).
206 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 2691 et seq. (1993). The risk zone maps will identify areas
where liquifaction and landslides due to earthquakes pose a particular threat.
207 Id. § 2694(a).
208 Id. § 2694(c)(1).
209 Id. § 2694. See generally Robert M. Washburn, Residential Real Estate Condition
Disclosure Legislation, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 381 (1995).
210 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1102.6 (Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 43-4-44
(1998), TEX. PROP. CODE § 5.008(B) (1998) and Wis. STAT. § 709.03 (1997). The Oregon
statute gives the seller the option of providing the disclosure statement or a written dis-
claimer: "The seller makes no representations or warranties as to the condition of the real
property or any improvement therein, and that the buyer will be purchasing the property
,as is,' that is, with all defects, if any." OR. REV. STAT. § 105.465(2) (1996).
211 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.70.040 (1996); IND. CODE § 24-4.6-2-7 (1997); IowA
CODE § 558A.3(2)(A) (1998), S.D. CODE LAws § 43-4-44 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-522
(Michie 1995).
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Under the California statute, the enumeration of items for
disclosure does not limit or abridge any other statutory provisions
or preclude an action for fraud, misrepresentation or deceit.212
The remedy for a statutory violation may be actual damages
or rescission if the violation or misrepresentation is due to
negligence.213
MATERIAL FACTS
Clearly, not all facts have to be revealed to prospective pur-
chasers.214 Indeed, it is impossible to disclose every "fact" about
every inch of a dwelling, its history, underpinnings and surround-
ings. Consequently, the general rule is that only "material facts"
need be disclosed. The Restatement defines a material fact as one
which "a reasonable [person] would attach importance to its exist-
ence or nonexistence in determining... [the] choice of action in
the transaction in question."215 In other words, would the other
party act differently if made aware of the concealed fact?216 The
Restatement definition has been readily adopted by the courts.217 A
variation of the Restatement definition is to add that a fact is also
material if the vendor knows, or has reason to know, the pur-
chaser regards, or is likely to regard, the matter as important in
determining the choice of action, even if a reasonable person
would not so regard it. 211
Another definition of materiality is whether "it probably influ-
enced the making of the contract; that is, whether the plaintiffs
would have purchased the property for the price paid had they
been apprised of these conditions."219 Other courts view a fact as
material if it affects the value of the property.22 °
For some courts, materiality is not an issue "if the misrepre-
sentation is knowingly made" whereas a fact must be material if it
is innocently made.221 An alternative approach to determining
which facts are "material" is to look at specific situations in
212 CAL. CIV. CODE §1102.8 (1990).
213 See, e.g., S.D. CODE LAWS § 43-4-42 (1997); VA. CODE §§ 55-524B1, 55-524B2
(Michie Ann. 1995).
214 "Minor conditions which ordinary sellers and purchasers would reasonably disre-
gard as of little or no materiality in the transaction would clearly not call for judicial inter-
vention." Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68, 74 (N.J. 1974).
215 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (1977).
216 Chapman v. Hosek, 475 N.E.2d 593, 598 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
217 See, e.g., Lynn v. Taylor, 642 P.2d 131, 134 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982); Griffith v. Byers
Construction Co. of Kansas, Inc., 510 P.2d 198, 205 (Kan. 1973); Cousineau v. Walker, 613
P.2d 608 (Alaska 1980).
218 Ollerman v. O'Rourke, 288 N.W.2d 95, 107 (Wis. 1980).
219 Kaze v. Compton, 283 S.W.2d 204, 207 (Ky. 1955).
220 Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1985); Kaze v. Compton, 283 S.W.2d
204, 208 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955).
221 See, e.g., Shane v. C. J. Hoffmann, Jr., 324 A.2d 532, 536 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974).
1998]
Chapman Law Review [Vol. 1:13
which courts have viewed specific facts as material. The list of
these material facts include defects in the structural integrity of
the property,222 expansive soil,223 building a house over a cess-
pool,224 the existence of fill,225 leaky roofs,226 roach infestations,227
termite infestations,225 unstable soil conditions,229 unstable foun-
dations,23° defective sewer system,231 defective septic system,3 2
water damage, 233 and the adequacy of the water supply. 234 A mate-
rial misstatement also exists for stating in a listing that flood in-
surance is not required. 5  Material facts include not only
problems which pose a safety risk, but any material fact affecting
the value of the property.236
CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES
Real estate transactions may also fall under the ambit of state
consumer protection statutes.2 37 For example, in the New Jersey
case of Strawn v. Canuso,235 one cause of action was stated pursu-
ant to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, which prohibits "the
knowing concealment, suppression, or omission of any material
fact... in connection with the sale or advertisement of any mer-
chandise or real estate .... ,,239 The omission of a material fact
with intent that others rely upon the omission is an unlawful
222 See, e.g., Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
223 Burkett v. J.A. Thompson & Son, 310 P.2d 56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
224 Weikel v. Sterns, 134 S.W. 908 (Ky. 1911).
225 Barnhouse v. City of Pinole, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881, 891 (Ct. App. 1982); Burkett v. J.A.
Thompson & Son, 310 P.2d 56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Buist v. C. Dudley De Velbiss Corp., 6
Cal. Rptr. 259, 263 (Ct. App. 1960); Cohen v. Vivian, 349 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1960); Loghry v.
Capel, 132 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Iowa 1965).
226 Johnson v. Davis, 449 So. 2d 344 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984).
227 Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68 (N.J. 1974).
228 Hill v. Jones, 725 P. 2d 1115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Lynn v. Taylor, 642 P.2d 131
(Kan. Ct. App. 1982); Soniat v. Johnson-Ras & Hays, 626 So. 2d 1256 (Ala. 1993) (failure to
fully produce evidence of old termite damage); Godfrey v. Steinpress, 180 Cal. Rptr. 95 (Ct.
App. 1982); Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 207 (Ct. App. 1963).
229 Barnhouse v. City of Pinole, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881 (Ct. App. 1982).
230 Easton v. Strassberger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Ct. App. 1986).
231 Shane v. Hoffman, 324 A.2d 532 (Pa. 1974).
232 Catucci v. Ouellette, 592 A.2d 962, 963-64 (Conn. Ct. App. 1991).
233 Barnhouse v. City of Pinole, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881 (Ct. App. 1982).
234 Lyon v. Ward, 221 S.E.2d 727, 729 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976).
235 Chapman v. Hosek, 475 N.E.2d 593 (111. App. Ct. 1985); see also Revitz v. Terrell,
572 So. 2d 996 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990).
236 See, e.g., Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1988); Gauerke v. Rozga, 332
N.W.2d 804 (Wis. 1983); Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982) (size of property,
dry well).
237 See, e.g., Real Estate Marketing, Inc. v. Franz, 885 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1994); Beard v.
Gules, 413 N.E.2d 448 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Gabriel v. O'Hara, 534 A.2d 488 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110g(a) (1998); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art. 2545 (West 1998).
But see State v. First National Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982) (failure to
disclose lots were subject to flooding from Lake George).
238 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995).
239 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 1989).
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practice. When applicable, brokers are especially susceptible to
liability under these statutes.24 ° Actual knowledge may also be a
prerequisite to liability.24'
OFF-SITE CONDITIONS
Upon recognition that a duty might exist to disclose material
on-site hazards to the purchaser, it then became obvious that off-
site conditions could pose an equal, if not greater, risk to the pur-
chaser.4 2 In reality, defects in construction will often have only a
minimal impact on the habitability of the structure. However, de-
fects in siting may often be irreparable and result in the destruc-
tion of the structure. Consequently, the duty to disclose has been
extended to off-site conditions, both of a natural origin and of
human origin.
Liability clearly exists if defective construction results in the
flooding out of a house.243 The same risk exists if a home is built in
a flood plain. Thus, in one case where the developer knew of the
danger of the vendor's home lying within the drainage path of the
5-year storm, the court held the seller had a duty to tell buyer that
the lot was situated in a flood plain.2" Similarly, constructing a
residence at the toe of a hillside gives rise to a duty to disclose.245
Disclosure must also be made of external natural forces that can
impact on the property, such as seasonal watercourses.246 Pur-
chasers on hillsides should also be informed that the drainage sys-
240 See, e.g., Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1981) (misrepre-
sentation of square footage of house); Young v. Joyce, 351 A.2d 857 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975);
McRae v. Bolstad, 646 P.2d 771 (Wash. App. 1982); Mongeau v. Boutelle, 407 N.E.2d 352
(Mass. 1980) (misrepresentation as to acreage); Beard v. Gress, 413 N.E.2d 448 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1980).
241 For example, the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act has been construed to
require knowledge of hazards before a broker could be held liable under the statute. See
generally Michael D. Isacco, Comment, A Massachusetts Real Estate Broker's Duty to Dis-
close: The Quandary Presented by AIDS Stigmatized Property, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV., 1211,
1216-20 (1993).
242 By way of analogy, substantial secondary authority exists for the disclosure of off-
site environmental dangers. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Dalberth, Unfair and Deceptive Acts
and Practices in Real Estate Transactions: The Duty to Disclose Off-Site Environmental
Hazards, 97 DICK. L. REV. 153, 176 (1992) (analyzing necessity and impact of consumer
protection statutes); Sarah L. Inderbitzin, Taking the Burden Off the Buyer: A Survey of
Hazardous Waste Disclosure Statutes, 1 ENVT. LAw. 513, 519-20 (1995); Note, Imposing
Tort Liability on Real Estate Brokers Selling Defective Housing, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1861,
1871-74 (1986) (arguing that duty should be imposed on brokers to inspect and disclose
reasonably discoverable defects). See generally Frona M. Powell, The Seller's Duty to Dis-
close in Sales of Commercial Property, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 245, 273-74 (1990) (exploring the
recent trend of imposing on sellers a duty to disclose conditions of real property).
243 See, e.g., Wawak v. Stewart, 449 S.W.2d 922 (Ark. 1970).
244 Village Development Co. v. Filice, 526 P.2d 83 (Nev. 1974).
245 ABC Builders, Inc. v. Philips, 632 P.2d 925 (Wyo. 1981) (the house was thereby
placed in the path of a potential landslide); see also Conolley v. Bull, 65 Cal. Rptr. 689, 697-
98 (Ct. App. 1968) which held a developer negligent for building without providing ade-
quate drainage, thereby causing a landslide.
246 Nei v. Burley, 446 N.E.2d 674 (Mass. 1983).
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tem is designed to use the streets in front of their houses, thereby
posing a risk of overflowing onto the premises.247
More recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court held a duty ex-
ists to disclose the existence of a town landfill near hundreds of
residential homes. Plaintiffs alleged the builder/developer knew
of the toxic landfill before considering the site for residential de-
velopment. The court held the developer and its sales agents are
under a duty to disclose off-site conditions which will adversely
affect the value and enjoyment of the property. The Environmen-
tal Protection Agency had warned against building homes near
the landfill, which was suspected of containing toxic waste. In an
unanimous opinion, the court stated:
We hold that a builder-developer of residential real estate or a
broker representing it is not only liable to a purchaser for af-
firmative and intentional misrepresentations, but also for non-
disclosure of off-site physical conditions known to it and
unknown and not readily observable by the buyer if the exist-
ence of those conditions is of sufficient materiality to affect the
habitability, use, or enjoyment of the property, and therefore,
render the property sufficiently less desirable or valuable to the
objectively reasonable buyer. Whether a matter not disclosed by
such a builder or broker is of such materiality, and unknown
and unobservable by the buyer, will depend on the facts of each
case and will be decided by a jury.248
NONPHYSICAL PROBLEMS
Some courts have given credence to a duty to disclose condi-
tions that arise from the dwelling itself, such as a house with a
history.249 Such homes may be "stigmatized." These stigmatized
properties may have a lower value, or take longer to sell, because
of emotional or psychological reactions triggered by the knowledge
of homicides,25 ° suicides, other crimes,251 diseases and natural
deaths, or ghosts,252 that have occurred on the premises. The fa-
mous California case of Reed v. King28 involved a failure of the
seller to inform the purchaser the home had been the site of multi-
ple homicides ten years earlier. In a subsequent New York case
involving "poltergeists," the appellate tribunal noted that, while
247 Yox v. City of Whittier, 227 Cal. Rptr. 311 (Ct. App. 1986) and Sheffet v. County of
Los Angeles, 84 Cal. Rptr. 11 (Ct. App. 1970); cf Miller v. Los Angeles County Flood Con-
trol Dist., 505 P.2d 193 (Cal. 1973).
248 Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995).
249 See Marianne M. Jennings, Buying Property from the Addams Family, 22 REAL Es-
TATE J. 43 (1993). See generally Ross R. Hartog, The Psychological Impact of AIDS on Real
Property and a Real Estate Broker's Duty to Disclose, 36 ARiz. L. REV. 757 (1994).
250 Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1988).
251 See, e.g., Ikeda v. Curtis, 261 P.2d 684, 691 (Wash. 1953) (Bordello).
252 Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
253 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1983).
[Vol. 1:13
Geologic Hazards in Real Estate Transactions
caveat emptor would permit a recovery against the vendor, rescis-
sion would be in equity." 4
Many legislatures reacted to the California and New York de-
cisions by enacting legislation that protects the sellers and their
agents from failing to disclose to a purchaser that a property is
stigmatized.255 These "shield laws" preclude a cause of action for
nondisclosure of "stigmatized" property. However, the seller must
still respond truthfully to a question by the prospective
purchaser.5 6
The value of a plot of land or dwelling may also be affected by
a nonphysical, off-site problem, such as the presence of a neighbor-
hood nuisance or criminal activity.257 As with the Ohio case of Van
Camp v. Bradford,25 the duty to disclose may include criminal ac-
tivity in the neighborhood. A renter's daughter was raped in de-
fendant's house on October 30, 1991. On December 30, 1991
another rape occurred in a neighboring house. Defendant listed
her house for sale on that day. Plaintiff, a single mother with a
teenage daughter, submitted an offer to buy the house on Febru-
ary 4, 1992.
The purchaser inquired about the bars on the basement win-
dows. The seller replied that they were installed sixteen years
earlier after a break-in, but no problems currently existed with
the residence. The house was broken into two months after the
closing. Two additional rapes subsequently occurred in the neigh-
borhood. The court viewed the crime problem as a latent defect,
which could not be observed by the purchaser on a walk-through.
The court thereby recognized that psychological stigma may
therefore constitute a latent defect that renders the doctrine of ca-
veat emptor inapplicable. 9
254 Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
255 A few statutes require disclosure of psychologically stigmatized property. See, e.g.,
S.D. CODE LAWS § 43-4-44(IV)(4) (1997); VA. CODE § 55-524A (1995). More common are
statutes which provide the sellers and brokers do not have to disclose the previous occu-
pant of the property had AIDS. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1710.2 (1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-
35.5-101 (1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-329dd (1997); D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1936(f) (1996);
FLA. STAT § 689.25 (1994); HAw. REV. STAT. § 467-14(18) (1997); ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 111,
para. 5831.1 (1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.250 (Michie 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.565
(1996); N.M. STAT. § 47-13-2 (1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 858-513 (1996); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 93.275 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-57-270 (Law. Co-op. 1996); TENN. CODE § 66-5-110
(1993); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a § 15(C) (West 1991).
256 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-1-16 (1991).
257 Alexander v. McKnight, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453 (Ct. App. 1992). Surrounding land uses
can affect the property value of homes. Thus, the Board of Tax Review in Greenwich, Con-
necticut reduced by 4.7 to 10% the assessed valuation of nine homes located near a halfway
house. Dirk Johnson, Taxes Cut for Neighborhoods in Homes for Mentally Ill, N.Y. TiMEs,
Apr. 11, 1985, at B2, cols. 1-6.
258 623 N.E.2d 731 (Ohio Com. Pleas 1993). The sale occurred prior to enactment of
the Ohio Disclosure Act, OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30 (Anderson 1997) and thus was
subject to the common law.
259 Id. at 736.
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DEFENSES RELATED TO CAVEAT EMPTOR
Merger Clauses
The caveat emptor doctrine was historically strengthened by
the "merger clause," whereby only representations contained in
the four corners of the deed were recognized. Thus, any oral rep-
resentations would disappear. Such a clause has also fallen by the
wayside in the twentieth century,26 and is no defense against a
cause of action for fraud.261
"As Is" Clauses
Another common occurrence was the insertion of an "as is"
clause in the sales agreement; i.e., the property is sold in an "as is"
condition. After all, a buyer who knowingly purchases a "fixer-
upper" should not subsequently complain about defects in the
property.
However, builders, developers and sellers started to routinely
include "as is" clauses in sales contracts. Once the implied war-
ranty of habitability was recognized in the sale of new homes,
courts soon struck down "as is" clauses in the agreement since
such a clause would effectively nullify the implied warranty of
habitability.262 As a matter of common sense, no purchaser rea-
sonably expects a new structure to be sold in an "as is" condition.
Courts also increasingly struck the clause down in situations
involving defects in the property. Thus, an "as is" clause will not
protect the seller against fraud,263 fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion,264 fraudulent concealment,265 fraudulent nondisclosure,266
material misrepresentations of fact,267 misrepresentation or pas-
sive concealment. 26" As one court explained, an "as is" clause allo-
cates the risk of loss arising from conditions unknown to the
260 See, e.g., Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 206 (Ct. App. 1963).
261 Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
262 See, e.g., Smith v. Old Warson Development Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972); Davies
v. Bradley, 676 P.2d 1242 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); Briarcliiff West Townhouse Owners Ass'n v.
Wiseman Construction Co., 480 N.E.2d 833 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). Similarly, an exculpatory
clause will not affect an action for fraud. Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate Co., 510
N.E.2d 409, 415 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
263 Loghry v. Capel, 132 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1965); Wagner v. Cutter, 757 P.2d 779
(Mont. 1988); Rayner v. Wise Realty Co. of Tallahassee, 504 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. Ct. App.
1987); Brewer v. Brothers, 611 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 201, 208-9 (Ct. App. 1963).
264 Gibb v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 910, 917-18 (Neb. 1994).
265 Kaye v. Buehle, 457 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983); Mancini v. Gorick, 536
N.E.2d 5 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Ct. App. 1963);
Danann Realty Co. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1959).
266 Rather v. Wise Realty Co. of Tallahassee, 504 So. 2d 1361, 1364 (Fla. Ct. App.
1987).
267 Cruse v. Coldwell Banker/Graben Real Estate, Inc., 667 So. 2d 714 (Ala. 1995).
268 Driver v. Melone, 60 Cal. Rptr. 98, 101-2 (Ct. App. 1970).
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parties.269 The clause will not therefore protect the seller against
a known defect.
Conversely, an "as is" clause may be upheld if the buyer signs
it after being made aware of potential problems in the neighbor-
hood, such as settling and foundation problems. 7 ° In such a situa-
tion though, the purchaser is fully informed of the risks.
As we have seen, the duty to disclose can be triggered by a
query by the purchaser. 271 Thus, when the seller answered the
buyer's questions about the condition of the electrical system by
responding, "You have nothing to worry about," the "as is" clause
in the sales contract was nullified. 2
THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE
A hallowed maxim of the common law is that if the reason for
a rule changes, then so too should the rule.273 Caveat emptor was
premised on an equality of knowledge and bargaining power be-
tween purchaser and seller. The doctrine was also developed dur-
ing a time of laissez faire wherein the government promoted,
rather than regulated, commerce.
Certainly a major factor in activating the duty to disclose is
the difference in access to information between the professional
seller of residential real estate and the usual buyer. Much of the
reason for abrogating caveat emptor is to protect buyers. The or-
dinary purchaser is not in a position to discern defects, and must
rely upon the builder or developer of a new home.274 In addition,
the ordinary purchaser of existing homes is often unable to ascer-
tain defects . 5 Thus, the purchasers are often unable to protect
themselves.
We should not realistically expect a purchaser to check the
county clerk's office, the planning and zoning commission files, the
Army Corps of Engineers, the United States Geologic Society, the
state geologist, other agencies,276 and the internet,277 prior to
269 Lorenzo v. Noel, 522 N.W.2d 724, 726 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
270 See, e.g., Leatherwood, Inc. v. Baker, 619 So. 2d 1273 (Ala. 1993).
271 See notes 74 and 156, supra, and accompanying text.
272 Brewer v. Brothers, 611 N.E.2d 492, 493 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). ($2,000 to repair the
electrical system).
273 See, e.g., CAL. CIrv. CODE § 3510 (1872) (causing any rule, for which there is no
longer a need, to cease); see also, Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 260 P.2d
765 (Wash. 1953) (holding that charitable, nonprofit hospitals should no longer be held
immune from liability for their employer's negligence).
274 See, e.g., Moxley v. Lorraine Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo. 1979).
275 See, e.g., Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 561 (Tex. 1968).
276 For example, the California Department of Conservation prepares and maintains
an inventory of landslide maps, provided for use by local governments as part of the Land-
slide Hazard Identification Program.
277 For example, California residents can check out the earthquake risks in their
homes and neighborhoods at the following websites: <http://www.eqe.com/> and <http://
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purchasing a house, much less bringing a building inspector, hy-
drologist, geologist and meteorologist to the site.
Nor can we reasonably expect a potential purchaser to search
for a myriad of potential problems, such as asbestos, carpenter
ants, defective septic and sewer systems, dry rot, faulty plumbing,
lead paint, radon gas275 and termites. Some, but not all, of these
problems may be observable by an inspector in making the stan-
dard inspection prior to the close.279
As this survey clearly establishes, the property law doctrine of
caveat emptor was already in major decline at the time of the fa-
mous 1942 case of Swinton v. Whittensville Savings Bank.
Through a combination of judicial and legislative actions, caveat
emptor no longer retains much viability.
Indeed, the limiting property doctrine of caveat emptor has
been supplanted by the expansive tort law concepts of implied
warranties and the duty to disclose. Fraud, misrepresentation,
warranties of habitability, and especially duties to disclose are all
Tort constructs. In addition, caveat emptor does not protect the
seller against liability to third parties. The Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 353 provides liability to a vendor of real estate who
either fails to disclose, or conceals, any condition which produces
an unreasonable risk to people on the land.2"'
We thereby recognize and posit a tort duty on the part of the
seller, and the seller's broker, to disclose material geologic
hazards of which the seller, and the seller's broker, know, or rea-
sonably should know. The law should impose, based upon reason-
able foreseeability, a duty on developers of new developments,
sellers of existing structures, and the selling agents, a duty to dis-
close to prospective purchasers if the building is located in a geo-
logically fragile area, such as an earthquake or landslide zone.
The disclosure statement should include:
1. The nature of the risk;
2. Historical occurrences of the risk in the area;
3. Scientific projections of the risk in the area;
4. The potential magnitude impact should the risk materialize;
and
5. The estimated chance of the risk materializing.
www.homerisk.com/>. Other information web sites on earthquakes are <http://www.scec.
org/> and <http://edcwww.cr.wsgs.gov/dclass.html>.
278 Naturally occurring radon contaminated soil is a major problem on the East Coast,
with heavy concentrations in the Appalachian Mountains, Florida, New England, New
Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania. See Frank B. Cross and Paula C. Murray, Liability
for Toxic Radon Gas in Residential Home Sales, 66 N.C. L. REv. 687, 692 (1988). The buyer
should be aware of uranium toxicity under the house. Schnell v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 850
(Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
279 However, even a building inspection is not designed to discern latent defects or off-
site geologic or neighborhood problems.
280 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1965).
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Liability in tort law is normally based upon establishing a
duty of care. In turn, the duty of care in negligence is based upon
a variety of factors, of which the most prominent is the reasonable
foreseeability of the risk.28'
The standard of care is flexible. Duty is proportional to the
potential harm. As the risk increases, so does the standard of rea-
sonable care.282 For example, only slight care might be required
with a stock watering pond in an isolated, rural area. Conversely,
the highest duty of care, bordering on strict liability, would be in-
volved in designing, constructing, and maintaining a large dam
overlooking a major population center.283
Tort law has progressively expanded liability during the last
half of the twentieth century. Immunities have been abrogated.2
Long-standing limitations on "duty" have been lifted,28 5 new
causes of actions recognized,28 6 and causation issues addressed. 287
281 The California Supreme Court made foreseeability of the risk the major factor in
establishing duty in a series of cases in the 1970s and 1980s. See, e.g., Bigbee v. Pacific Tel.
& Tel. Co., 665 P.2d 947, 951-53 (Cal. 1983) (presenting all issues of defendant's negligence
in context of inquiry whether accident was reasonably foreseeable); Weirum v. RKO Gen.
Inc., 119 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1975) (defining foreseeability as "a primary consideration in estab-
lishing" duty). See also Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal.
1976) (calling foreseeability the most important factor in determining duty). More recent
cases revert back to the reasonable foreseeability of the risk. See, e.g., Ann M. v. Pacific
Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 213-14 (Cal. 1993) (stating that a landowner has a duty
to protect others from third-party acts only when those acts may be reasonably
anticipated).
282 This principle was set forth in the germinal negligence case of Brown v. Kendall, 60
Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 296 (1850). As stated by Prosser and Keeton:
[I]f the risk is an appreciable one, and the possible consequences are serious, the
question is not one of mathematical probability alone. The odds may be a thou-
sand to one that no train will arrive at the very moment that an automobile is
crossing a railway track, but the risk of death is nevertheless sufficiently serious
to require the driver to look for the train and the train to signal its approach ....
As the gravity of the possible harm increases, the apparent likelihood of its occur-
rence need be correspondingly less to generate a duty of precaution.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 31, at 171 (5th ed.
1984).
283 See Mayor of New York v. Bailey, 2 Denio 433, 440-41 (N.Y. 1845); see also Eikland
v. Casey, 266 F. 821, 823 (9th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 652 (1920); Erickson v.
Bennion, 503 P.2d 139 (Utah 1972).
284 Charitable immunity, Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 260 P.2d
765 (Wash. 1953); interspousal immunity, Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205 (Miss. 1988);
parent-child immunity, Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963); sovereign immunity,
Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District., 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Cal. 1961).
285 Abrogation of the locality rule in medical malpractice suits, Cobbs v. Grant, 104
Cal. Rptr. 505 (Cal. 1972); guest statutes, Brown v. Merlo, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (Cal. 1973);
negligent infliction of emotional distress on bystanders, Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal.
1968); owners and occupants of land, Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
286 Dram shop, Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984); insurer's bad faith refusal
to settle, Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. of New Haven, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (Cal. 1967); inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d
282 (Cal. 1952); malpractice, Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974); Ybarra v. Span-
gard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944); medical monitoring, Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d
287 (N.J. 1987); products liability, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(Cal. 1962); wrongful birth, Berman v. Allen, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979).
Chapman Law Review
Liability in tort law is not based on whether a similar event
has occurred before, but whether this particular risk is foresee-
able. Past occurrences are a major, but not exclusive, factor in
determining the foreseeability of the risk. Foreseeability is not
based just on history, but also upon that which science and tech-
nology can project into the future. History can tell us which areas
have been subjected to forces of nature. Science may predict
which regions are subject to such forces in the future. Even if a
natural force had not struck a particular location before, liability
may still exist if reasonable design, construction, operation, in-
spection or maintenance should have anticipated and thereby pre-
vented or minimized the risk.
The Tort concept of duty can be very expansive. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court held in 1968 in Conner v. Great Western Sav-
ings & Loan Association that a bank was liable to the home
owners in a subdivision."' The homes suffered serious damage
from cracking caused by ill-designed foundations that could not
withstand the expansion and contraction of adobe soil. The con-
tractor laid slab foundations on adobe soil without taking proper
precautions recommended by soil engineers.
The bank had warehoused the land for developers. The bank
knew, or should have known, the developers were inexperienced
and operating on a dangerously thin capitalization. In addition,
the bank knew or should have known, of the expansive soil prob-
lem. Yet it failed to require soil tests, examine foundation plans,
or recommend changes. Liability would arise if the activity ex-
tended outside the scope of normal lending activities or if the
lender had been a party to misrepresentation.
As discussed in Conner, the purchaser of a home is ill-
equipped with experience or financial means to discern structural
defects. 89 A home is both a major investment and the only shelter
for the buyer.29 °
In Karoutas v. Homefed Bank,291 the California Court of Ap-
peals held the beneficiary, with actual knowledge of facts materi-
ally affecting the value of the property, has a duty to disclose these
facts to prospective bidders at a trustee's sale. The purchasers
paid $173,000 for the property, then discovered soil conditions and
other defects in the residence that would cost in excess of $250,000
to repair. The beneficiary's own studies had estimated repairs
287 See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (Cal. 1980) (market
share liability); Mitchell v. Gonzales, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 913 (Cal. 1991) (proximate cause).
288 Conner v. Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n., 33 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. 1968). The
holding was subsequently limited by the legislature to preclude liability for normal lending
activities. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3434 (1997).
289 Id. at 378.
290 Id.
291 283 Cal. Rptr. 809 (Ct. App. 1991).
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would cost in excess of $350,000, would not be economically feasi-
ble, and recommended the residence be demolished. However, no
disclosure was made to the purchasers, who could not inspect the
property prior to the trustee's sale. The court recognized caveat
emptor does not apply to nonjudicial foreclosure sales.292
In Mortert v. CBL & Associates,293 the Supreme Court of Wyo-
ming held a theater operator owed a duty to warn theater goers
that flash flood warnings existed and that citizens were advised to
stay off the streets.
THE FORESEEABILITY OF THE RISKS
Every year witnesses the loss of human life and the wide-
spread destruction of property due to natural forces, such as
floods, earthquakes and hurricanes. Many of these fatalities occur
because the dwellings were located in ill-advised geologic settings,
subject to the inexorable forces of nature.
There are no natural disasters; human activity invites the re-
sulting tragedy by building in, on, or under areas that are subject
to the forces of nature. These forces of nature are natural acts.
The tragedies are of human origin.294
"Natural disasters" are often the results of a high population
density in geologically fragile areas. As civilization, especially an
uninformed and unprepared population, encroaches upon geologi-
cally fragile areas, the potential for tragedies increases. 295  The
292 Id. at 814.
293 741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1987).
294 See generally ANDERS WIJKMAN & LLOYD TIMERLAKE, NATURAL DISASTERS: ACTS OF
GOD OR ACTS OF MAN, (1984) (stating that disasters are increasingly man-made political
and social events which, although triggered by natural phenomena such as floods or earth-
quakes, are often preventable). Their thesis states:
Though triggered by natural events such as floods and earthquakes, disasters are
increasingly man-made. Some disasters (flood, drought, famine) are caused more
by environmental and resource mismanagement than by too much or too little
rainfall. The impact of other disasters, which are triggered by acts of nature
(earthquake, volcano, hurricane) are magnified by unwise human actions.
Id. at 6.
295 For example, one of the difficulties in fighting modern forest fires is the problem of
"urban interface," in which homes are invading the wilderness. These developmental pres-
sures change the matrix of factors which determine how a fire is to be fought. In the past,
some areas would be left to burn themselves out. That option may be effectively hindered
by the presence of human habitation. See Timothy Egan, New Hazard in Fire Zones:
Houses of Urban Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1994, at Al (outlining the hazards of living
in potential fire zones); John Kifier, In Washington, Saving Scenic View Taking on Impor-
tance in Firefighting, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 1994, at B6 (discussing the difficulties of fighting
forest fires in populated areas).
New Orleans is considered especially vulnerable to hurricanes. The city rests six feet
below sea level, and is surrounded by water on three sides. It is protected from flooding by
an extensive series of levees. In addition, the Army Corps of Engineers has devised a by-
pass system through the Atchafalaya, to divert floodwaters from the Mississippi River to
the Gulf, and the Bonnet Carre spillway into Lake Pontchartrain, thereby substantially
reducing the threat of swollen Mississippi River water flooding New Orleans. Conse-
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hubris of the human race is that it believes technology can trump
nature.296 This belief, coupled with years of natural quiescence,
can lead to false senses of security and resulting catastrophes.
Complacency, ignorance and an otherwise casual disregard of the
risks can lead to over-development.297
Landslide risks are a prime example of human activity inten-
sifying the risk. The most frequent causes of landslide are water
from intensive rainfall or human-introduced sources. 29' As with
quently, the severe 1993 flooding of the Missouri and Upper Mississippi River Basins left
New Orleans unscathed. However, the levees and diversion systems will not protect New
Orleans against a major hurricane tracking up the Mississippi River from the Gulf of Mex-
ico. In one expert's worst case scenario, "New Orleans could become a lake 20 feet deep."
The storm surge would enter Lake Pontchartrain, top the 16-foot levees, and pour into the
city. The levees would then serve as dams retaining the storm water in New Orleans, most
of which lies at or below sea level. Frances F. Marcus, Storm Adds Reality to New Orleans
Drill, N.Y. TimEs, May 14, 1995, at 18.
New Orleans has been struck at least nine times by hurricanes. New Orleans exper-
ienced hurricanes in 1817, 1837, 1887, 1900, 1915, 1939, 1947, 1965 (the infamous Hurri-
cane Betsy) and 1969 (the equally infamous Hurricane Camille). Other hurricanes struck
coastal areas of Louisiana and may have come close to New Orleans. A history of hurri-
canes striking Louisiana is found at Mark Schleifstein, et al., Eyeing a Hurricane, NEW
ORLEANS TrMEs-PIcAYuNE, May 30, 1993, at J1.
296 Two examples will suffice. First, in spite of the devastation caused by the
Northridge Earthquake of January 17, 1994 to the greater Los Angeles freeway system,
one expert believes that enough is known "about the behavior of structure in earthquakes
that we can design them so that they survive intact." Calvin Sims, Quake Damage Shakes
Faith in Overpass Designs, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 24, 1994, at Al, A10.
Second, the Mississippi River has a long history of flooding and rechannelling itself.
Indeed, Mark Twain wrote:
"One who knows the Mississippi will promptly aver-not aloud, but to himself-
that ten thousand River Commissions, with the monies of the world at their back,
cannot tame that lawless stream, cannot curb it or confine it, cannot say to it, Go
here, or go there, and make it obey; cannot save a shore which it has sentenced
MARK TWAIN, LIFE ON THE MISSISSIPPI, 172-73 (Signet Classic 1961).
Yet, the Chief of Engineers concluded in 1926 that river improvements would prevent
the "destructive effects of floods." PETE DANIEL, DEEP'N AS IT COME: THE 1927 Mississippi
RWVER FLOOD 6 (1977).
297 For example, weather patterns are cyclical. Thus, there has been a decrease over
the past century in the number of major hurricanes striking the East Coast and Florida
peninsula. Eric Morgenthaler, He's No Blowhard: Dr. Gray Can Predict Atlantic Hurri-
canes, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 1994, at Al.
However, it is estimated that sooner or later a major hurricane will again strike the
northeastern United States. The famous 1938 hurricane which struck Long Island and
New England is ranked as the seventh most costly hurricane in United States history, and
the worst ever recorded in the Northeast. A hurricane of similar magnitude, striking the
Northeast today, could be the costliest in United States history because of the extensive
development in the region, inadequate design and construction to withstand hurricanes,
and inadequate evacuation and sheltering procedures. William K. Stevens, Historic Hurri-
cane Could Catch Northeast With Its Guard Down, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 23, 1994, at C4.
In spite of the devastation unleashed upon south Florida by Hurricane Andrew in
1992, the National Hurricane Center ranked it as only the third most intense storm to hit
land in the United States this century, following Hurricane Camille in 1964, and the 1935
Labor Day hurricane that struck the Florida Keys, killing 600 people. Hurricane Andrew is
Termed Third Worst in This Century, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 18, 1992, at A16.
298 Roger R. Olshansky & J. David Rogers, Unstable Ground: Landslide Policy in the
United States, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 939, 943 (1987). Earthslides can often be traced to lack of
support in the underlying soil or instability in the soil above.
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other natural hazards, landslide damage is intensified because of
increased development in hillside areas, 299 and encroachment
upon potentially unstable slopes.3 0 Landslide risks can be height-
ened by poor forestry practices, development on improper fill and
poor grading.30 1 The risks of landslides can be reduced through
enforcement of grading ordinances, advanced engineering and
earthquake practices. However, landslides will still occur in hill-
side areas.0 2
A strong argument exists that governmental agencies should
never have issued the requisite zoning and building permits. The
purpose of this article is not to discuss the potential liability of
governmental agencies in issuing permits for such areas as flood-
plains or earthquake zones. The issuance of a permit does not ne-
gate the risk to the uninformed purchaser.
Many forces of nature cannot be controlled. Volcanoes are a
classic example. If and when a volcano erupts, the extent of the
eruption, and the velocity and direction of the magma flow are not
subject to human influences. Predictability is of limited applica-
tion. 3  Other forces of nature, such as hurricanes, can be tracked,
but the precise point of impact on land is still not predictable.
Similarly, structural survivability cannot be guaranteed against
natural forces, such as earthquakes, fires, hurricanes or torna-
does. Shorelines, seismic zones, and slopes are inherently
unstable.
Yet the lack of scientific certainly does not preclude Tort lia-
bility. For example, a builder may be liable in negligence for fail-
ure to use reasonable construction and design techniques to
minimize the foreseeable risks.304 Even where forces of nature
cannot be accurately predicted, controlled or programmed, they
can still be detected, measured, observed and be subject to general
299 Id. at 944.
300 Id. at 941.
301 See generally Nigel Skermer, Landslides: Acts of God, or Acts of Man, 50 THE ADvo-
CATE 931 (1992).
302 Olshansky, supra note 298, at 967.
303 See generally Kenneth Reich, On Shaky Ground: Despite High-Tech Tools, Predict-
ing Volcanos' Behavior Is Still a Very Inexact Science, L.A. TiMEs, Jan. 22, 1998, at B2, cols.
1-4.
3o4 Earthquake technology has sufficiently advanced such that two commentators
wrote: "Because cost-effective technology is available to reduce substantial injuries associ-
ated with an earthquake, the judicial system should not protect isolated design profession-
als who ignore or fail to stay abreast of the tribulations." William D. Flatt & Wesley R.
Miner, When the Earth Moves and Buildings Tumble, Who Will Pay?-Tort Liability and
Defenses for Earthquake Damage Within the New Madrid Fault Zone, 22 MEM. ST. U.L.
REV. 1, 22-23 (1991). See generally John C. Peck & Wyatt A. Hoch, Liability of Engineers
for Structural Design Errors: State of the Art Considerations in Defining the Standard of
Care, 30 ViLAANOvA L. REV. 403 (1985); Matthew S. Steffey, Negligence, Contract and Ar.
chitects Liability for Economic Loss, 82 Ky. L.J. 659 (1993-94).
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foreseeability.305 A simple example will suffice. A lightening bolt
striking a utility line may be a force of nature not subject to pre-
cise predictability as to the point of impact, but failure to ground
the line is a human act of negligence. °6
The real question, which remains after the demise of caveat
emptor, is who should have the burden of obtaining the requisite
geologic information: the seller or purchaser.3 07 In theory, at least,
the purchaser could discover almost every risk through title
searches, house inspections, checking geologic records, and surfing
the net. Such information is recorded in history books, almanacs,
newspaper archives, government records, °8 government studies,
investigative reports, official studies, and individual memories.
The information may even be obtainable on-line through the
internet.
However, such a standard would not only place an onerous
burden on the purchaser, but would in fact resurrect caveat
emptor under a new guise. Similarly, we could hold that the duty
to disclose varies depending upon the knowledge, intelligence and
experience of the purchaser. Such a standard would be extremely
unpredictable and subjective.
Conversely, the seller's broker is a professional with exper-
tise. The brokers, just as developers, know, or reasonably should
305 Geologists now recognize that dozens of fault lines underlie the Los Angeles Basin.
These faults are referred to as blind faults because, unlike major fault lines such as the San
Andreas, they are not visible from the surface. Sharon Begley, et al., A Whole Lot of Shak-
ing Going On, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 31, 1994, at 34; Frederick Rose, Beneath Los Angeles, More
Earthquakes Are Lurking, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1994, at B1. One report stated that almost
100 active faults have been identified in the Los Angeles area. James F. Dolan et al., Pros-
pects for Larger or More Frequent Earthquakes in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Region, 267
Sci. 199 (1995).
Both the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake in northern California and the 1994
Northridge Earthquake in Los Angeles were initiated on previously unidentified faults, but
both "occurred in structurally complex and seismically active areas." Thomas L. Holzer,
Predicting Earthquake Effects - Learning from Northridge and Loma Prieta, 265 Sci. 1182,
1183 (1994). Earlier earthquakes in both areas had alerted scientists to the potential risks
in the area. Id.
306 Central Ga. Elec. Membership Corp. v. Heath, 4 S.E.2d 700, 702 (Ga. Ct. App.
1934). Similarly, failure to protect against lightning striking oil storage tanks which were
not vapor proof, and which had open holes on top, constitutes negligence. Tex-Jersey Oil
Corp. v. Beck, 292 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana (1956), affd in part rev'd in
part, 305 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1957).
307 See Key Sales Co. v. South Carolina Elec. and Gas Co., 290 F. Supp. 8, 27 (D.S.C.
1968) (stating that plaintiff was responsible for not checking the history prior to purchase);
Gill v. Marquoit, 525 P.2d 1030, 1032 (Or. 1974) (holding that sellers are entitled to assume
that purchasers will inquire about susceptibility of land to flooding). See also Fairmont
Foods Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 616 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that pur-
chaser had the burden of proving that the undisclosed information was not within its rea-
sonable reach); Brown v. B & D Land Co., 823 P.2d 380, 382 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) ("The
means and knowledge of obtaining the truth regarding the property were readily available
to plaintiff upon inquiry.").
308 See, e.g., Chapman v. Hosek, 475 N.E.2d 593, 599 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (finding that
an action for fraud existed even though information that showed the property flooded, was
in the public record).
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know, of the potential geologic problems with the property be-
cause of their duty, responsibility, and knowledge of the area.
Science has identified the major geologic fault lines,0 9
mapped floodplains" ° and landslide zones,31' recognized the vul-
nerability of coastal zones and barrier islands,312 and distin-
guished dormant from extinct volcanoes. Tort law clearly imposes
a duty "to anticipate the usual weather of the vicinity, including
all ordinary forces of nature."' 1' Such foreseeable forces of nature
309 Congress adopted the Earthquake Hazard Reduction Act of 1977, in which it was
recognized that all 50 states are vulnerable to earthquakes. Thirty-nine states are consid-
ered at risk for moderate to major earthquakes. Although earthquakes in California get
most of the publicity, earthquakes have occurred in all 50 states. Major fault lines include
the San Andreas in California, the Cascadia in Washington, the Wasatch in Utah, and the
New Madrid in the Mississippi Valley. In fact, three of the largest earthquakes in United
States history occurred during the winter of 1811-1812 on the New Madrid Fault. U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL BUILDING: MANY ARE THREATENED BY EARTH-
QUAKES, BUT LIMITED ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN 15 (May 1992).
31o Federal maps highlighting floodplains are available at city and county government
offices and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers has been mapping floodplains of the United States for decades.
311 The United States Geologic Survey and several state agencies have undertaken
landslide mapping. Robert Olshansky & J. David Rogers, Unstable Ground: Landslide Pol-
icy in the United States, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 939, 952-54 (1987). For example, studies indi-
cated slides have occurred in a section of Anaheim Hills for decades. Surveyors and
engineers reported substantial levels of ground water in the hills in the early 1950s. The
city allowed construction in the 1970s and early 1980s. In the winter of 1993 almost 29
inches of rain fell in the area, resulting in the earth sliding 12 inches in some areas.
About 240 homeowners have filed suit against the city, county, metropolitan water
district and several private concerns. See Ann Pepper, El Nino Haunts Those in '93 Slide
Zone, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Oct. 20, 1997 at p.1, col.1.
These studies are precisely the type of information potential purchasers should be
aware of in making an informed decision. States with major landslide risks include Ala-
bama, California, Colorado, Illinois, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah and Washington. Richard L. Meehan et al., The Battered Exclusion: Who
Pays How Much for Landslides, 29 FOR THE DEFENSE 19, 22 (1987).
California initiated a Landslide Hazard Identification Program in 1985.
312 Congress enacted the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-
1464, to protect the nation's coastal resources and to encourage states to promulgate
coastal zone management plans. Reappraisals of the wisdom of developing the coastal zone
and barrier islands on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts occur after every major hurricane. See,
e.g. Peter Applebome, After Hugo, a Storm Over Beach Development, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
1989, at Al. The devastation inflicted by Hurricane Hugo gave rise to the restrictions in-
validated in Lucas v. South Carolina, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). These risks deal with erosion.
A less common, but more dangerous, risk to certain coastal areas are tsunamis, commonly
referred to as tidal waves. Over 50,000 people have been killed by tsunamis around the
world over the past century. Scott McCredie, When Nightmare Waves Appear Out of No-
where to Smash the Land, SMITHSONIAN, Mar. 1994, at 32. Hawaii is the most vulnerable of
the 50 states. Id. at 33. Hilo, Hawaii is struck by tsunamis more often than any other
place in the United States. Id. at 39. "In Hilo, Hawaii, every telephone book has maps that
show tsunami inundation zones and safe areas." Id. This information could easily be made
available to real estate purchasers.
313 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS, § 44, at 304 (5th
ed. 1984).
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include avalanches,314 blizzards,315 erosion, expansive soil,316 fires,
floods, landslides, 317 high winds 318 and rain.
319
The purpose of disclosure is to give the purchaser an informed
choice, analogous to informed consent in medical procedures, full
disclosure in securities law, and warnings in product liability
cases.320 Personal autonomy then allows the individual to make a
personal assessment of the risks and benefits of the contemplated
transaction. The informed, potential purchaser may then disre-
314 In 1975 the Supreme Court of Washington held the State of Washington may have
assumed a common law duty of care to warn of an avalanche danger. Although the court
had difficulty understanding the facts, and had to deal with a "hypothetical" factual back-
ground, it held that a cause of action would exist against the state if it had negligently
misled others. Brown v. MacPherson's, 545 P.2d 13 (Wash. 1975).
315 See McKinley v. Hines, 215 P. 301, 303 (Kan. 1923); Diamond Cattle Co. v. Clark,
74 P.2d 857 (Wyo. 1937).
316 For example, parts of Colorado contain "expansive soil," which expands when wet.
Steve Raabe, Soiled Homeowners Sue Developer Over Damage From Expanding Ground,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 1996, § 16, at 5L, col. 5.
317 Some states, such as California and Colorado, require communities to consider
landslide risks in formulating their land use plans. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302(g) (West
1998) and CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-65.1-103(8)(a) (1990). Landslide litigation in a state such
as California may give rise to liability under a number of theories, such as strict liability,
Avner v. Longridge Estates, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (Ct. App. 1969); implied warranty against
the builders and graders, Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 525 P.2d 88 (Cal. 1974), and
negligence against neighboring property owners, Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 636 P.2d 1121
(Cal. 1981). Unsettled coastal soil, continental-edge geography and hilly geography are
prime territory for landslides in California. Stuart M. Gordon & Diane R. Crowley, Earth
Movement and Water Damage Exposure: A Landslide in Coverage, 1983 INS. CouNs. J. 418.
318 See, e.g., Naxera v. Wathan, 159 N.W.2d 513 (Iowa 1968); Jacobson v. Suderman &
Young, Inc., 17 F.2d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 1927) (noting that wind may be an expected occur-
rence depending on knowledge of local weather conditions for certain times of the year);
Cachick v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 15, 19 (S.D. Ill. 1958) (holding that where strong
winds should be expected the act of God defense does not excuse negligent construction);
Fairbrother v. Wiley's, Inc., 331 P.2d 330, 337 (Kan. 1958) (ruling that if defendant should
have anticipated strong and gusty winds liability will attach regardless of the natural
phenomenon).
319 See, e.g., Garret v. Beers, 155 P. 2, 4 (Kan. 1916) (holding that the fact that heavy
rains had occurred "many times before" rendered defendant liable for failing to adequately
safeguard against flooding); Webb v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 18
N.W.2d 563, 568 (Neb. 1945) (holding that although a rainfall may be extraordinary if it is
such that has occasionally occurred, it should be foreseen by reasonable person); Fairbury
Brick Co. v. Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 113 N.W. 535, 537 (Neb. 1907) (holding that ear-
lier rainfalls of the same magnitude, although unusual, render a defendant responsible for
reasonable precautions); Cottreu v. Marshall Infirmary, 24 N.Y.S. 381, 382-83 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1893) (holding that a similar rainfall in 1869 demonstrated that such rainfalls that
washed away defendant's dam were not so phenomenal as to absolve defendant of liability);
Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Pomeroy, 3 S.W. 722, 724 (Tex. 1887) (holding that history of such
flooding made flooding foreseeable and, thus, left defendant liable); Holter Hardware Co. v.
Western Mortgage & Warranty Title Co., 149 P. 489 (Mont. 1915); Milton D. Taylor Constr.
Co. v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., 572 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (holding that when
rainfall is reasonably expected one cannot claim such as unforeseeable and beyond the con-
trol of the party).
320 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 402a, cmt. K (1979) (a proper warning nulli-
fies liability in cases of unavoidably unsafe products).
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gard the warnings, walk away from the deal, or negotiate a lower
price.
21
The purpose of the warning is not to change the decision of
individuals.322 We should not realistically expect large numbers of
individuals to change their behavior when society collectively de-
cides to develop these geologically fragile lands. Indeed, popula-
tion growth will necessitate an increased development and
spillover into geologically fragile areas.
For example, the population of the Los Angeles and San Fran-
cisco metropolitan areas continues to increase despite the well rec-
ognized risks of being near the San Andreas and other faults.2 3
321 For example, mudslides in the Big Rock Mesa area of Malibu, and Pasadena Glen,
occurred in areas that had been identified by California Department of Conservation geolo-
gists as susceptible to landslides during heavy winter rain. Bus. WIRE, Feb. 9, 1994 (avail-
able on WestLaw at 2/9/94 B WIRE). The Big Rock Mesa landslide in 1983 damaged or
destroyed 250 expensive homes overlooking the Pacific Ocean. The litigation against Los
Angeles County and the California Department of Transportation was settled for $97 mil-
lion. Mark Thompson, Big Rock is Big No More, CAL. LAW., Mar. 1989, at 32.
The Big Rock Mesa slide gave rise to extensive litigation, including an attempt to re-
voke the real estate license of a broker. See Vaille v. Edmonds, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Ct. App.
1991). A 1982 geologic report discussing slide dangers was provided to the buyers in 1983.
A second report was prepared in 1983. The purchaser then intended to conduct a visual
inspection, but had trouble reaching the property because of a landslide on the Pacific
Coast Highway, just east of the property. The geologist told the purchaser "about the
steady erosion on the property, but this did not seem to trouble him, and he joked that he
would be dead before the bluff eroded all the way to the house." Id. at 4. Several other
warnings were provided prior to the close of escrow. The house was subsequently lost in a
slide. The purchaser then testified "they would not have purchased the house if they had
been aware of a groundwater or landslide danger." Id. at 7.
An Oakland, California resident, who lives along the Hayward Fault, stated: "Living
here is a considered risk .... But I love this area, and I'd rather live to be 50 in the Bay
Area than 100 in Kansas." With Fault Like Kobe, Fears Rise in Oakland, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
23, 1995, at All.
Mammoth Mountain is a major ski resort east of Los Angeles. It has been rocked by
scores of volcanic induced earthquakes with magnitudes of 3 and 4+. One condo owner
stated: "It just makes your vacation more interesting .... If you're gonna go, how would
you rather go? In a freeway accident on the I-5 or chased down Mammoth by a wall of lava?
No contest. Let's hit the mountains." Esther Schrader, Mammoth Skiers Are Taking
Quakes in Stride, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1998, at A22, col. 1.
322 Warnings are not always effective in changing behavior, witness the large number
of people who still smoke. See, e.g., Tara Parker-Pope, Danger: Warning Labels May Back-
fire, WALL ST. J., April 28, 1997, at B1, col. 3; Steven Waldman, Do Warning Labels Work?
Their Increasing Use May Carry a Risk of Overkill, NEWSWEEK, July 18, 1988, at 40;
Michael de Courcy Hinde, As Warning Labels Multiply, Messages Are Often Ignored, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 1988, at 1, col. A3.
The purpose of warnings in real estate transactions will be to give the purchaser an
informed choice, not necessarily to change behavior.
323 For example, the population of the United States increased 9.8% between 1980 and
1990, from 226,545,805 to 248,709,873. However, California's population rose 25.7%, from
23,667,902 to 29,760,021, and Florida's population increased 32.7%, from 9,746,324 to
12,937,926. 1995 INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC, ATLAS AND YEARBOOK 828 (48th ed.
Houghton Mifflin Co. 1995). Most of California's population resides in geologically fragile
areas. The Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange county complex had 15,047,772 people as of July
1, 1992, and the San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose area had an additional 6,409,891 people.
Id. at 827. Of the ten metropolitan statistical areas and consolidated metropolitan statisti-
cal areas that had the largest population gains between 1990 and 1996, the Los Angeles-
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The population of the Puget Sound region is rapidly growing in
spite of earthquake and volcanic risks. 24 Furthermore, people
continue to build along the Atlantic shoreline in spite of warnings
and knowledge the ocean is clearly reclaiming beaches. In the
words of one commentator:
There is the familiar barrier beach tale of hope against hope,
trust that shoreline engineering can fool Mother Nature, reli-
ance in the great faucet of Government disaster aid and cheap
storm insurance and ultimately, denial of the obvious-that is,
that all up and down the Atlantic Coast, the sea, aided by
storms and hurricanes, is slowly but inexorably rolling up and
over beaches.325
CLEAR, OPEN, AND OBVIous HAZARDS
A close look at many of the cases which "validate" caveat
emptor reveals consent in a contractual sense or assumption of
risk in a tort context. Purchasers should not be able to consciously
blind themselves to apparent dangers and then claim ignorance. 26
Thus, a purchaser, given the opportunity to undertake a physical
inspection of the property, should not be heard to complain of de-
fects that reasonably should have been discovered during such an
inspection. An understandable hesitancy exists to grant judicial
rights to parties unwilling to look out for themselves. Even the
California Court of Appeals in the landmark case of Easton v.
Strasberger stated:
Cases will undoubtedly arise in which the defect in the property
is so clearly apparent that as a matter of law a broker would not
be negligent for failure to expressly disclose it, as he could rea-
sonably expect that the buyer's own inspection of the premises
would reveal the flaws.327
Riverside-Orange County area led with an increase of 963,626. Number nine was San
Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, followed by Seattle-Tacoma-Bremerton. Steven A. Holmes,
Immigration Is Fueling Cities' Strong Growth, Data Shows, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 1, 1998, at Al,
col. 5 (nat. ed.).
324 Mt. Rainier is a dormant, but far from extinct, volcano which majestically towers
over the Puget Sound region. It is but one of several volcanoes which form the Pacific Rim
of Fire. Mt. Rainier is an active volcano, which last blew 150 years ago. Experts cannot
estimate when it might erupt again. See Jon Krakauer, Geologists Worry About Danger of
Living "Under the Volcano," SMITHSONIAN, July 1996, at 33. The potential risks, if Mt.
Rainier erupts, vastly exceed the damages inflicted by its neighboring volcano, Mt. St.
Helens, in its eruption of May 18, 1980, which destroyed plant and animal life for 150
square miles. Id. at 33, 34. The potential mudflow zones, should Mt. Rainier erupt, have
been charted. It is estimated that over 100,000 people live in homes built in debris washed
down the mountain by catastrophic debris flows (known to geologists as "lahars"). Id. at 34.
325 B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Sea Threatens Costly Building, Reviving a Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 1997, at A7, col. 1.
326 See, e.g., Zack Cheek Builders, Inc. v. McLeod, 597 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1980).
327 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
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Oregon has held no duty exists to disclose land is susceptible
to flooding. 28 The Oregon Supreme Court noted that river flood-
ing is a matter of common knowledge-so common in fact that a
seller may ordinarily assume a purchaser knows, or will discover,
the phenomenon. 329 Thus, in Oregon, no duty exists to disclose ge-
ologic hazards which are obvious. Oregon has similarly held no
implied warranty of habitability exists with the potential risk of
erosion of oceanfront lots."' Recovery has also been denied when
the purchaser could have easily discovered the property was lo-
cated in a floodplain.331
Thus, the owners of a building known as the "Under the Hill
Club," which rested at the base of a tall, near vertical bluff over-
looking the Mississippi River, should not have been surprised
when a large section of the bluff collapsed on the building during a
mudslide3 2 caused by excessive rainfall.
These cases do not stand up to close scrutiny, though, when
dealing with the ordinary purchaser of a home. These purchasers
are not architects, engineers, fire marshals, geologists, hydrolo-
gists or meteorologists. Many hazards, such as avalanches, bliz-
zards, erosion, fire, floods, geologic faults, hurricanes, insect
infestations, psychic impairment and latent defects, and torna-
does, may not be readily observable to the reasonable home buyer.
If observed, the full risk might not reasonably be appreciated.33
Some hazards may seem well known and obvious.334 How-
ever, in light of today's highly mobile population, such an assump-
tion may be invalid. Natural geologic forces, such as weather
patterns, may ebb and flow in cycles over millennia, but the
328 Gill v. Marquoit, 525 P.2d 1030 (Or. 1974); see also Nei v. Burley, 446 N.E.2d 674
(Mass. 1983) (no duty to disclose existence of seasonal watercourse across property).
329 Id. at 1032. Conversely, a Texas case held flood hazards are not a fact of which
brokers should have known. Ozuna v. Delaney Realty, Inc., 600 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. 1980).
330 Beri, Inc. v. Salishan Properties, Inc., 580 P.2d 123 (Or. 1978).
331 Brown v. B&D Land Co., 823 P.2d 380 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991).
332 O'Malley v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 776 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1985).
The section which collapsed was estimated to be about 50' by 30' by 10', and weighed
800,000 to 1,000,000 pounds.
333 As expressed in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 207 A.2d 314, 324 (N.J. 1965), "While the
evidence may indicate that Messrs. Kreitzer and Schipper had become aware of the ab-
sence of a mixing valve, they may not have fully appreciated the extraordinary nature of
the risk and, in any event, any omissions or contributing fault on their part would not
preclude a finding that Levitt had been negligent and was to be held responsible to others
who foreseeably might be injured as a result of its negligence."
334 In the famous California case of Sprecher v. Adamson, 636 P.2d 1121, 1122 (Cal.
1981) the downslope land was subject to landslide risks from the upslope property. The
risk has been evident since the turn of the century. Yet people developed the area anyway.
See also Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Ct. App. 1984) (discussing soil
problems and landslides in Diablo, California); Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 73
Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. 1968) (discussing foundational problems due to expanding and con-
tracting adobe soil in Ventura County, California); Oakes v. The McCarthy Co., 73 Cal.
Rptr. 127 (Ct. App. 1968) (discussing improper grading and filling of real estate lots in Los
Angeles County).
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human reality is often limited to a short time span. Indeed, wher-
ever someone new moves into an area, that person's framework of
reality starts anew because of unfamiliarity with the natural per-
ils. 35 People may move into an area during the dry cycle, and
then be totally surprised by the wet cycle.
For example, the natural beauty of beachfront communities in
Southern California may issue a "siren" call to new residents, who
are unfamiliar with the risks of earthquake, fire, erosion, wind,
flooding, landslides and ocean storms. Similarly, a person buying
a house in a Southern California canyon may be unaware of the
cycle of drought, wind, fire and floods that plague these seemingly
beautiful, placid settings.3 However, these dangers are well-
known to community planners, real estate developers and envi-
ronmentalists. Such dangers should also be communicated to the
purchaser.
In addition, even long-term residents, who may have exper-
ienced the risks in the past, may have been lured into a false sense
of security by decades of geologic quiescence. Geologic "stability"
or quiescence leads to complacency. For example, landslides are
not a major problem during drought years. Residents may also
rush to rebuild on the assumption that it either cannot happen
again or that improved construction techniques will prevent a
recurrence.
3 37
Even a knowledge of a general risk may be insufficient to war-
rant a finding of specific knowledge . 3  For example, there is obvi-
ously a general knowledge of earthquake risks in California, but
these risks are actually pervasive throughout the country. The
335 For example, a court noted that a resident of New York City could not be expected
to have familiarity with the folklore of Nyack, New York. Plaintiff was, thus, unaware he
contracted to purchase a haunted house, "widely reputed to be possessed by poltergeists."
Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (App. Div. 1991).
336 See Charles Fleming et al., A Flammable Mix of Man and Nature, NEWSWEEK, Nov.
8, 1993, at 55 (discussing the effect of the Santa Ana winds on fires in the Los Angeles
Basin area). The Santa Ana winds blow in from the east, carrying the heat of the deserts.
If the dry hillsides catch on fire when the Santa Ana winds are blowing, the fires rapidly
spread and become more difficult to fight. Conversely, excessive, but rare, precipitation
sometimes causes flash floods. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (demonstrating damage and problems caused
by flash floods in Los Angeles County). For a graphic portrayal of the fire-flood cycle in the
San Gabriel Mountains outside Los Angeles, see JOHN MCPHEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURE
183-272 (1989). The chapter is aptly entitled "Los Angeles Against the Mountains."
337 A year after a levee broke in California's Central Valley, a person moved his trailer
into the shadow of the dike that broke. He stated: "I figure, it can't happen again." Phil
Garlington, Living Along the Levees, ORANGE CoUNr REGISTER, Dec. 28, 1997, at News 12,
col. 1.
338 A Homeowners' Guide to Earthquake Safety may be delivered to the purchaser of
real property in California. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10149 (1997). An additional publi-
cation by the California Department of Real Estate, ENVIRONMENTAL HAzARDs-A GUIDE
FOR HOMEOWNERS AND BUYERS (1991), is also made available. These brochures deal with
general risks and do not address the need for a disclosure of specific risks in individual
transactions.
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specific risks in California vary by region, soil condition and con-
tractors' methods. The differences in risks will often not be ob-
servable to the naked eye. 39
A general risk of hurricanes exists for the Atlantic and Gulf
Coasts, Puerto Rico, Hawaii and Guam. Yet no specific risk exists
until a specific threat to a specific area has been identified. Simi-
larly, almost any building can catch on fire, but some methods of
construction, such as shake roofs, and landscaping, such as (dry)
foliage close to an abode, are high risk in fire prone canyons of
California. Prospective purchasers may also notice cracks, flak-
ing, bulges, or peeling, but may not be able to assess the signifi-
cance of these phenomena.
Geologic instability, such as with landslide areas, may be visi-
ble to observers.34 ° Yet, the purchaser may reasonably rely upon
the issuance of permits by the public agencies, the expertise of the
developer and builder, and perhaps decades of "no problem," in
acquiring the property. The purchaser is also probably unable to
assess the stability of a slope. 41
The collective knowledge of risks transcends individual
knowledge. Thus, the risks posed by the New Madrid Fault may
not be fully appreciated by residents of St. Louis, Little Rock or
Memphis, but these risks are known to the scientific community.
We expect architects, engineers and contractors to take these
risks into consideration in exercising reasonable care in designing
and constructing an edifice.3 42 The standard of reasonable care at
a minimum requires compliance with building codes, but more sig-
nificantly, to apply the standard of a reasonable architect or engi-
neer under the circumstances.
The geologic information that is reasonably available to the
construction industry is just as available to the real estate indus-
try. There is no hidden magic in ascertaining the presence of flood-
339 A recent article in the Los Angeles Times indicates the living room of the house
made famous by the famous TV family of Ozzie and Harriett Nelson lies astride the
Hollywood fault. Philip Fradkin, Fractured Dreams, L.A. TIMES MAG. 16, 37 (Jan. 25,
1998).
340 As one law review commentator has written: "Malibu: Where the Slide Meets the
Tide," Rob Risley, Landslide Peril and Homeowners' Insurance in California, 40 UCLA L.
REV. 1145 (1993).
341 Even experts may have difficulty predicting the location and probability of a land-
slide. Robert B. Olshansky & J. David Rogers, Unstable Ground: Landslide Policy in the
United States, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 939, 944 (1987).
342 For example, an Arkansas statute provides:
Hereafter, neither the state, any county, city, township, village or private entity
shall construct, add to, alter, retrofit, or remodel any public structure unless the
structural elements are designed to resist the anticipated forces of the designated
seismic zone in which the structure is located....
1991 Ark. Acts 1100 § 4 (Arkansas Environmental Resident Design Act).
1998]
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plains, avalanche perils, canyons, volcanoes, seismic fault lines
and similar geologic hazards. 43
CONCLUSION
As we enter the twenty-first century, the time has come to
formally inter caveat emptor, an anachronistic doctrine of the six-
teenth century. The reasons justifying the doctrine have long
since been superseded by twentieth century developments. The
New Jersey Supreme Court has led the way in Strawn v. Canuso.
Instead, we should formally adopt the Tort concept of a duty
to disclose material geologic hazards in real estate transactions.
Tort concepts of fraud, misrepresentation, and warranties have ef-
fectively rendered caveat emptor a shell of its former self. Statu-
tory disclosure legislation has further diluted caveat emptor.
Expanding population pressures have increasingly settled in
geologically fragile areas. Living in such areas therefore increases
the risk that a "natural disaster" will result in loss of life and
substantial property damage. The prospective residents should
therefore be apprised of the risks before purchase.
343 For an example of the lack of warning by real estate brokers to purchasers of
properties in the Los Angeles hills, see JOHN MCPHEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURE 251-54
(1989).
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